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ARTICLE

HOW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IS MADE:
THE CASE OF THE GOLDEN LEASH

MATTHEW D. CAIN†
JILL E. FISCH††
SEAN J. GRIFFITH†††
STEVEN DAVIDOFF SOLOMON††††
This Article presents a case study of a corporate governance innovation: the
incentive compensation arrangement for activist-nominated director candidates
colloquially known as the “golden leash.” Golden leash compensation arrangements
are a potentially valuable tool for activist shareholders in election contests. In response
to their use, a number of issuers adopted bylaw provisions banning incentive
compensation arrangements. Investors, in turn, viewed director adoption of golden
leash bylaws as problematic and successfully pressured issuers to repeal them.
This study demonstrates how corporate governance provisions are developed and
deployed, the sequential responses of issuers and investors, and the central role played
by governance intermediaries—activist investors, institutional advisors, and
corporate law firms.
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The golden leash also presents an opportunity to test the response of share prices
to governance innovation. We conducted two cross-sectional event studies around key
dates that affected the availability of the golden leash. Our core finding is that share
prices of firms facing activist intervention reacted positively to events that make
golden leashes more available and negatively to events that make golden leashes less
available. Moreover, we found that this governance innovation did not affect every
firm in an identical manner. Only the share prices of those firms most likely to be
subject to activist attention experienced statistically significant share price reactions.
Our research contributes to the debate over how corporate governance is made
and its economic significance. Although we found that corporate governance
provisions may be priced, at least in some circumstances, our study also suggests that
corporate governance is a complex story involving the actions and reactions not merely
of the firm and its shareholders but of a variety of intermediaries and interest groups
that have agendas of their own.
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INTRODUCTION
How is corporate governance made? In one telling, corporate governance
is endogenous and closely tailored to firm-specific needs.1 Companies adopt
those governance provisions that are designed to create the greatest value
given the firm’s particular situation.2 Alternatively, governance mechanisms
may be adopted by or imposed upon firms without regard to firm value in
order to insulate self-interested executives or directors, or to respond to
interest group pressures.3 Between these two poles lies a spectrum of other
tales about corporate governance and its impact on firm value. And yet, in
spite of the persistent disagreement surrounding these accounts, there is an
increasing emphasis on adherence to the “right” governance principles
espoused by activist hedge funds and institutional investors, even though
these principles are often unproven and difficult to evaluate empirically.4
We use a case study of a corporate governance innovation—the golden
leash—to shed light on how corporate governance originates and how it is
valued. Activist hedge funds invented the golden leash as a tool for attracting
and incentivizing director candidates in a proxy contest. Under the terms of
the golden leash, these hedge funds agreed to pay their director nominees
millions of dollars if the nominees were successful both in winning board
seats and achieving the hedge fund’s desired objectives.
The golden leash burst onto the scene in 20125 when JANA Partners, LLC
(JANA) offered to pay its nominees to the board of Agrium, Inc. (Agrium) an

1 See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991).
2 Id.
3 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd–Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II,
95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1786 (2011) (maintaining that Congress passed the Dodd–Frank Act in a
hasty reaction to the events of the 2008 financial crisis without properly assessing its impact);
Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE
L.J. 1521, 1585 (2005) (arguing that Congress enacted the Sarbanes–Oxley governance mandates as a
result of political pressure and without adequately evaluating their efficiency).
4 See, e.g., Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Lack of Consensus on Corporate Governance, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/30/business/a-lack-of-consensus-oncorporate-governance.html [http://perma.cc/BUZ6-ZW72] (criticizing institutional investors for
“advocating whatever the conventional wisdom of the moment says is good corporate governance”).
5 JANA first entered into a golden leash compensation agreement in 2007 in connection with the
2008 annual meeting at CNET Networks and JANA’s attempt to elect a number of dissident directors
to the CNET board. See Letter Agreement Between Jon Miller and JANA Partners (Dec. 23, 2007),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1015577/000090266408000019/p07-1802exh_7.txt [http://pe
rma.cc/QPS3-9ATL]. JANA disclosed the compensation agreement in the proxy materials that it
filed with the SEC, but the agreement did not receive any public attention and became moot when
CNET decided to sell itself before the culmination of the proxy contest. See CBS–CNET Deal is Good
News for JANA, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (May 16, 2008), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/05/16/cb
s-cnet-deal-is-good-news-for-jana [http://perma.cc/38QB-A4QN]; see also JANA Master Fund, Ltd.
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additional $50,000 each, if elected, plus a collective total of 2.6% of JANA’s net
gain on the investment.6 Around the same time, Elliott Management (Elliott)
agreed to pay its dissident nominees to the Hess Corp. (Hess) board an
additional $30,000, if elected, for each percentage point by which Hess
outperformed its peers over a three-year period.7 These pay arrangements offered
potential compensation in the millions to be paid directly by the activists to their
nominees. As such, the arrangements had the potential to tie the interests of
the nominees, once elected, to the activists that had nominated them.
Accordingly, opponents of the arrangements dubbed them “golden leashes.”8
The golden leash was immediately controversial. JANA and Elliott
justified the golden leash by the need, first, to get the right people onto their
slates and, second, to incentivize those people, once elected, to push the
company to outperform.9 According to this account, golden leashes empower
shareholders by providing directors committed to unlocking hidden value and
increasing market returns. Critics of the golden leash, however, derided these
arrangements as pernicious innovations that merely emboldened those who
would “jeopardize a company’s ability to generate sustainable long-term
returns” and “destroy jobs.”10
Opponents of activist shareholders soon responded with an innovation of
their own. On May 10, 2013, Martin Lipton of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &
Katz (Wachtell), a prominent law firm known for defending firms against
activist interventions and hostile takeovers, issued a public memorandum
recommending that corporations adopt bylaws prohibiting golden leash
compensation arrangements (the “Wachtell Bylaw”).11 In relatively short
v. CNET Networks, Inc., 954 A.2d 335, 337, 339-40 (Del. Ch. 2008) (describing JANA’s intended proxy
contest and holding that CNET could not block the contest by invoking its advance-notice bylaw).
6 See infra notes 83–92 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 93–97 and accompanying text.
8 To our knowledge, Agrium’s Board Chair, Victor J. Zaleschuk, was the first to use the term
“golden leash” to describe these compensation arrangements. See Press Release, Agrium, Agrium
Urges Shareholders to Vote the White Proxy for Agrium’s Director Nominees (Mar. 4, 2013),
http://www.agrium.com/en/investors/news-releases/2013/agrium-urges-shareholders-vote-white-pr
oxy-agriums-director-nominees [http://perma.cc/687W-ASVQ]; see also David Benoit & Joann S.
Lublin, ‘Golden Leash’ Payments Fuel Debate, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424052702304281004579220094112755708 [http://perma.cc/X32N-QNHA] (calling
the “golden leash” issue one of the “hottest topics in corporate governance”).
9 See infra notes 104–05 and accompanying text.
10 Martin Lipton, The Threat to Shareholders and the Economy from Activist Hedge Funds, HARV.
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 14, 2015), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2015/01/14/the-threat-to-shareholders-and-the-economy-from-activist-hedge-funds [http://perma.cc/
EV24-2F7C] (quoting Laurence Fink, CEO of Blackrock).
11 Martin Lipton, Bylaw Protection Against Dissident Director Conflict/Enrichment Schemes, HARV.
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 10, 2013), http://corpgov.law.harvard.
edu/2013/05/10/bylaw-protection-against-dissident-director-conflictenrichment-schemes [http://perma.
cc/N3MT-WVX4].
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order, more than thirty public companies adopted the Wachtell Bylaw.12
Moreover, because it could be adopted by any company virtually overnight,
the Wachtell Bylaw had a market-wide effect.13
The Wachtell Bylaw was challenged, but not in any court of law.14 Instead,
it provoked the wrath of a prominent proxy advisory firm, Institutional
Shareholder Services (ISS). On November 12, 2013, ISS recommended that
shareholders withhold their votes from directors at Provident Financial
Holdings, Inc. (Provident) because the bank had adopted the Wachtell
Bylaw.15 At the subsequent annual meeting, Provident’s director nominees
received a substantial number of withhold votes, and ISS threatened more
withhold recommendations, publishing a list of other firms that had adopted
the Wachtell Bylaw.16
Corporate America got the message. By May 20, 2014, twenty-eight of the
thirty-two companies known to have adopted the Wachtell Bylaw prior to the
Provident meeting had removed it in whole or in part.17 The golden leash, in
contrast, is far from dead: it has been used in several recent activist attacks,
notably those involving Dow Chemical (Dow) and General Motors.18 In
November 2014, Dow agreed to seat two Third Point, LLC (Third Point)

See CHRIS CERNICH ET AL., INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS. INC., WHEELING OUT
PROCRUSTEAN BED: BYLAW RESTRICTIONS ON DISSIDENT NOMINEE COMPENSATION 1
(2013), http://www.thedeal.com/first_word/Wheeling_Out_the_Procrustean_Bed_-_Bylaw_Restric
tions_on_Dissident_Nominee_Compensation-1.pdf [http://perma.cc/D46B-RGLH]. This figure is
as of the date of the Provident meeting discussed infra Section II.B, and excludes bylaw amendments
adopted by spinoff companies. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
13 Essentially, every company has the power to adopt the bylaw at any time unless it made a
binding commitment not to do so. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (2015).
14 To date, no court has issued an opinion evaluating the legality of golden leash compensation
arrangements or bylaws prohibiting their use.
15 The withhold recommendation was a direct response to the adoption of the Wachtell Bylaw.
As ISS explained, “ISS recommended ‘withhold’ votes for the election of the members of [Provident
Bank’s] nominating committee because its board adopted—without shareholder approval—a
corporate bylaw that barred director nominees from accepting compensation from anyone other than
the company during their candidacy or service as a board member.” JONES DAY, GOVERNANCE
PERSPECTIVES: ISS QUESTIONS DIRECTOR COMPENSATION BYLAW (2013), http://www.jones
day.com/files/Publication/e38a7775-2224-4d95-b2bf-c25e51340098/Presentation/PublicationAttachmen
t/e006df6f-96eb-4b41-9ddf-c6fb0696d82d/GP-ISS%20Questions%20Director%20Compensation%
20Bylaw.pdf [http://perma.cc/BW5R-N9LQ].
16 See CERNICH ET AL., supra note 12, at 2.
17 See infra Table I and accompanying text.
18 For a description of the compensation arrangement in the GM activist intervention, see
Press Release, Gen. Motors, GM Statement Regarding Receipt of Director Notice and Shareholder
Proposal from Harry J. Wilson (Feb. 10, 2015), http://media.gm.com/media/us/en/gm/news.detail.
html/content/Pages/news/us/en/2015/feb/0210-corp.html [http://perma.cc/T8PB-5H2W] (describing
Wilson as “indicat[ing] a fee arrangement under which [the activist group’s nominee] will receive a
percentage of the group’s profits from their investment in GM”). On Third Point’s use of a golden
leash arrangement in its attack on Dow, see Benoit & Lublin, supra note 8.
12
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nominees who became the first directors to be compensated pursuant to a
golden leash.19
The back and forth on the golden leash and the Wachtell Bylaw provides
a case study of how corporate governance originates and is tested by the
marketplace. The golden leash shows that corporate governance in many cases
is a product of “governance intermediaries,” each with its own agenda and
interests.20 Activist hedge funds may have invented the golden leash, but the
shape of the governance arrangements that ultimately emerged has as much
to do with the counseling of a corporate law firm and the advocacy of an
institutional proxy advisor as it does with the activists themselves. The
success or failure of a governance innovation may often depend upon the
position taken by such intermediaries.
While intermediaries may introduce these provisions, the question
remains whether they are beneficial to the companies adopting them. With
respect to the golden leash, this can be studied empirically. We did so by first
examining each company and the circumstances of its adoption and repeal of
the golden leash bylaw. We found that while some firms were reacting directly
to activist threats, others had no apparent rationale for adopting the Wachtell
Bylaw.21 Second, if the golden leash is economically good or bad, one would
expect to see stock price reactions—either positive or negative—in response to
firms’ adoption and repeal of the Wachtell Bylaw. We therefore ran a time series
analysis to determine how the market reacted to firms’ adoption and repeal
of the new corporate governance terms. We found no statistically significant
share price effect for those companies that adopted—and subsequently
repealed—the Wachtell Bylaw.22

19 See David Benoit, Proxy Adviser ISS Blesses Pay for Activist’s Directors at Dow, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/proxy-adviser-iss-blesses-pay-for-activists-directors-atdow-1429725478 [http://perma.cc/QL6M-9ZPS] (describing ISS’s “cautious” approval of the
compensation arrangement for the Third Point directors); see also Dow Chem. Co., Soliciting
Material Pursuant to § 240.14a-12 (Schedule 14A) (Nov. 13, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/29915/000119312514411302/d820869ddfan14a.htm [https://perma.cc/RJ6L-VNR4] (describing
the nominees’ compensation agreement as tied to the appreciation of Third Point’s shares).
Shareholders elected the negotiated slate of director candidates in May 2015. Press Release, Dow
Chem. Co., Dow Announces Results from Annual Stockholder Meeting (May 14, 2015), http://
www.dow.com/news/press-releases/dow%20announces%20results%20from%20annual%20stockholder%
20meeting%20may%202015 [http://perma.cc/QDV5-XENP].
20 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 867 (2013) (describing
activist hedge funds as “governance intermediaries” whose role is “to monitor company performance
and then to present to companies and institutional shareholders concrete proposals for business
strategy through mechanisms less drastic than takeovers”).
21 See infra Section III.B.
22 See infra Section III.C.
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We then looked further. Because a golden leash bylaw can be adopted
unilaterally at any time by the board of directors, we posited that what matters
is not the actual adoption of the bylaw but rather the bylaw’s availability for
adoption if and when the board decides that it is needed. Additionally, we
reasoned that the availability of a golden leash may not matter for all
companies, but only for those that face the imminent prospect of a proxy
contest or other activist intervention.
We examined this possibility by looking at the companies that
experienced shareholder activism during the period from one year prior to
the Wachtell Memorandum to one year after the Provident annual meeting.
We assumed market discrimination in pricing corporate governance terms
and hypothesized that we would find a share price reaction to the Wachtell
Memorandum in this subset of companies. Our results are consistent with
our hypothesis. We found a statistically significant decline in the share price
of “targeted firms” on the release of the Wachtell Memorandum and a
statistically significant increase in share price after the Provident vote.
Consistent with our theoretical predictions, these price effects were limited to
those companies most affected by the governance innovation in question—that
is, those companies most likely to experience activism. Companies not subject
to activist intervention had no statistically significant share price reactions.
Our findings contain several important implications for corporate
governance. First, they provide evidence that intermediaries play an
important role in channeling corporate governance innovation. Second, they
show that, at least in this case, corporate governance may be priced by the
market. Although our results suggest that investors responded to developments
regarding the golden leash, we note that the value assigned by the market may
not reflect the economic value of the leash itself, but may instead indicate
more general investor or market anticipation of potential activist
intervention. Third, our empirical findings provide evidence that investor
reactions may be based largely on salience, and governance intermediaries
play a critical role in creating this salience.
Ultimately, our findings are cause for caution regarding what constitutes
“good” corporate governance and how studies of governance are conducted.
While our case study examines only one event, it offers reasons to question
the relationship between short-term share price reactions and long-term
economic value. More generally, the evolution of corporate governance
innovations is a complex story involving the actions and reactions not merely
of the firm and its shareholders, but of a variety of intermediaries and interest
groups with their own agendas.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I reviews the academic debate over
how corporate governance is made and what value it adds. Part II presents
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our case study of the golden leash. Part III reports the results of our empirical
tests. Part IV considers the implications of our findings for corporate
governance scholarship. Part V closes with a brief summary and conclusion.
I. THE MAKING OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Much of the literature on the creation of corporate governance is
premised on a contractarian model of the firm, according to which governance
mechanisms reflect the terms of a bargain struck between investors and
managers.23 Although public company shareholders and managers typically
do not meet at a bargaining table, corporate governance can nevertheless be
modeled as the product of an investor–manager bargain, provided that
governance terms are priced in the capital market.24 Understanding that
investors are willing to pay more for favorable governance structures,
managers have an incentive to adopt these structures in order to lower the
company’s cost of capital.25 Investors, for their part, get the governance they
pay for. Much of the prior work on the production of corporate governance
therefore focuses centrally on the question of whether governance terms are
priced. Section I.A, below, reviews this literature.
But whether governance terms are priced is only half of the story.
Answering this question does not reveal how governance terms are made or
the considerations that ultimately factor into the pricing of corporate
governance. To answer the question of how corporate governance is made, the
roles of various institutional actors with a stake in corporate governance must
be considered. These capital market intermediaries—activists, corporate law
firms, and proxy advisors—have an important role to play in making
corporate governance. Section I.B, below, examines how these intermediaries
interact to create corporate governance reform.
A. Which Governance Terms Are Adopted?
According to mainstream corporate law theory, firms adopt governance
terms to maximize firm value, implying that governance terms have value and

23 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 15 (stating that “corporate law should
contain the terms people would have negotiated” and that it “almost always conforms to this model”).
24 See id. at 17 (“All the terms in corporate governance are contractual in the sense that they
are fully priced in transactions among the interested parties. They are thereafter tested for desirable
properties; the firms that pick the wrong terms will fail in competition with other firms competing
for capital.”).
25 See id. at 6 (“[S]elf-interested entrepreneurs and managers, just like other investors, are
driven to find the devices most likely to maximize net profits. If they do not, they pay for their
mistakes because they receive lower prices for corporate paper.”).
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that they are priced by the market.26 Corporate governance research has
therefore focused on the empirical question of whether and how particular
governance terms are priced as a necessary first step in answering whether
particular governance provisions are good or bad. Unfortunately, whether and
how the market prices corporate governance remains subject to dispute, as a
review of the recent literature shows.
Studies have shown that some governance provisions that weaken
shareholder rights and insulate managers from challenge are negatively correlated
with firm value. For example, publicly traded shares of firms with a controlling
shareholder trade at a so-called “minority discount.”27 Because minority shares
in a controlled corporation lack the ability to influence the management of
the firm, they trade at a discount relative to other shares.28 Moreover, studies
have found a negative relationship between staggered board provisions and
share price, suggesting that obstacles to a change of control have a negative
effect on firm value.29 Likewise, studies have found a negative relationship
between the adoption of state antitakeover statutes and stock price.30
In a similar vein, a line of studies has attempted to quantify a firm’s overall
corporate governance package by constructing indices of good corporate
governance and comparing the performance of firms with different ratings
according to the index. The first such study—by Gompers, Ishii, and
Metrick—incorporated twenty-four governance terms into a “Governance
Index” and found that firms that were more protective of shareholder rights
significantly outperformed those with fewer shareholder protections throughout
the 1990s.31 Building on this study, Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell narrowed the
Governance Index to a six-factor “Entrenchment Index” and found that high
scores for entrenchment were negatively associated with firm value.32
Meanwhile, Brown and Caylor built a broader index that included a number
26 See, e.g., Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 STAN. L.
REV. 1325, 1327 (2013) (explaining that, under the contractarian model, “market forces would lead
the parties to create governance arrangements and adopt legal rules that would minimize agency
costs and thereby maximize firm value”).
27 Michael J. Barclay & Clifford G. Holderness, Private Benefits from Control of Public
Corporations, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 371, 372 (1989).
28 John C. Coates IV, “Fair Value” as an Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in
Conflict Transactions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1262 (1999).
29 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON.
409, 418-30 (2005); Lucian Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN.
STUD. 783, 804-05 (2009).
30 See, e.g., Jonathan M. Karpoff & Paul H. Malatesta, The Wealth Effects of Second-Generation
State Takeover Legislation, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 291, 308-20 (1989).
31 Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107 (2003).
32 Bebchuk et al., supra note 29, at 788-90; accord K. J. Martijn Cremers & Vinay B. Nair,
Governance Mechanisms and Equity Prices, 60 J. FIN. 2859, 2871-78 (2005) (focusing on the
relationship between corporate governance terms and the market for corporate control).
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of variables not included in other indices, such as compensation practices,
independence, and meeting attendance, and found that their index was
correlated with firm value.33
Other studies, however, have produced inconsistent results concerning the
price effects of corporate governance variables. Black and Bhagat, for
example, extensively studied board independence and found no correlation
between independence and price,34 a result that Hermalin and Weisbach
confirmed in a review of a broader sample of the literature.35 Other studies
have found no universal, statistically significant wealth effects of poison pill
adoptions36 and at least one study found a significant increase in share value
attributable to poison pills in some circumstances.37 Moreover, recent work
by Cremers, Litov, and Sepe challenges the conclusion that staggered boards
have uniformly negative wealth effects.38 Instead, using time series analysis,
they find that staggered board provisions appear to contribute share value for
firms where a commitment to long-term value is more important—specifically,
more complex firms with greater research and development and more
intangible assets.39 Further, staggered boards do not seem to be priced in the
IPO market.40 Meanwhile, the share price effect of the corporate governance

33 Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. Caylor, Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation, 25 J.
ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 409, 428-29 (2006).
34 Bernard Black & Sanjai Bhagat, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and LongTerm Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 262-63 (2002).
35 Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Boards of Directors as an Endogenously
Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV.,
Apr. 2003, at 7, 12.
36 See, e.g., James A. Brickley et al., Outside Directors and the Adoption of Poison Pills, 35 J. FIN.
ECON. 371, 388 (1994) (“[T]he average stock-price reaction to the announcement of the adoption of
a poison pill is positive and significant when outside directors comprise a majority of the board and
negative and significant when they do not.”); Sudip Datta & Mai Iskandar-Datta, Takeover Defenses
and Wealth Effects on Security Holders: The Case of Poison Pill Adoptions, 20 J. BANKING & FIN. 1231,
1232-33 (1996) (“[T]he impact [of the announcement of adoption of a poison pill] on stockholders is
insignificant.”); Wallace N. Davidson III et al., The Importance of Board Composition and Committee
Structure: The Case of Poison Pills, 1 CORP. OWNERSHIP & CONTROL, Spring 2004, at 81, 81-82
(“[W]hether poison-pill adoption hurts or benefits shareholders may be situationally dependent.”).
37 Gary L. Caton & Jeremy Goh, Corporate Governance, Shareholder Rights, and Shareholder
Rights Plans: Poison, Placebo, or Prescription?, 43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 381, 390 (2008).
38 K. J. Martijn Cremers et al., Staggered Boards and Firm Value, Revisited 3 (July 14, 2014)
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2364165 [http://perma.cc/Y6K9-QXWM].
39 Id. at 7; accord Seoungpil Ahn & Keshab Shrestha, The Differential Effects of Classified Boards
on Firm Value, 37 J. BANKING & FIN. 3993, 4011 (2013) (finding that in complex firms the benefits of
staggered boards may outweigh the costs).
40 Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover
Protection in IPOs, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 107 (2001).
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indices appears to have disappeared, a fact that has recently been acknowledged
by several of the authors who constructed the original indices.41
This diversity of results could be due in part to the well-known
methodological problems associated with measuring the wealth effects of
corporate governance terms. Principal among these is the endogeneity
problem—the difficulty of separating the propensity of bad firms to select a
particular corporate governance term from the bad effects of the term itself.42
Moreover, the negative effect when bad companies adopt staggered boards
for entrenchment reasons may swamp the positive effect that staggered
boards provide to good companies as a commitment device.43 Another
complication is that some provisions may have market-wide effects depending
upon the mechanisms of adoption. To the extent that a governance term can be
adopted through unilateral board action—such as a bylaw amendment or a
poison pill—whether a company actually adopts the provision is unimportant
in light of the provision’s availability for adoption at any moment.44 In such
cases, only corporate acts credibly opting out of such provisions should have
any effect on price.45 Event studies may be particularly useful in such
situations.46 We therefore turn to this technique in Part III below.

41 See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Learning and the Disappearing Association Between Governance
and Returns, 108 J. FIN. ECON. 323, 324 (2013).
42 See, e.g., Renée B. Adams et al., The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A
Conceptual Framework and Survey, 48 J. ECON. LITERATURE 58, 59 (2010) (highlighting the
endogeneity problem in corporate governance); Matthew D. Cain et al., Do Takeover Laws Matter?
Evidence from Five Decades of Hostile Takeovers 19 (July 21, 2015) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2517513 [http://perma.cc/72NC-D3PF] (discussing endogeneity issues in
prior studies of corporate governance).
43 See Cremers et al., supra note 38, at 29-30 (explaining that although the traditional view is
that staggered boards are used to entrench management, for firms where longer-term commitments
are relevant, the adoption of a staggered board is associated with an increase in firm value).
44 See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the
Scientific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271, 277-78 (2000) (noting that because “every firm has a ‘shadow
pill[,]’ . . . adoption of an actual pill has no effect on a target’s legal takeover”); accord Emiliano M.
Catan, The Irrelevance of Active Poison Pills (Nov. 14, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (analyzing poison pill adoptions and renewals and finding no discernible economic effect).
45 It may be that opting in signals an underlying firm characteristic to which the market reacts,
but in this case the price effect is caused by the firm characteristic signaled by the governance
arrangement, not the governance arrangement itself. For example, the decision to adopt majority
voting may be a signal of a better-governed firm, leading the market to react favorably to firms that
adopt majority voting independent of whether a majority voting rule adds firm value. See Stephen
J. Choi et al., Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming
2016) (exploring the extent to which different behavior by firms adopting majority voting is
explained by a selection effect).
46 See, e.g., Alma Cohen & Charles C.Y. Wang, How Do Staggered Boards Affect Shareholder
Value? Evidence From a Natural Experiment, 110 J. FIN. ECON. 627 (2013) (analyzing share price
reactions to two important Delaware court decisions affecting the stringency of antitakeover provisions).
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B. How Does Corporate Governance Change?
Just as the question of what governance terms are adopted implicates
whether the market prices such terms, the question of how corporate governance
changes are made depends largely on the institutional intermediaries. The
conventional contractarian account of corporate governance is premised on
disintermediated capital markets through which shareholders exert influence
on corporate governance through their buy and sell decisions.47 Even this
model, however, reserves a place for investment bank underwriters and other
capital market intermediaries in determining the allocation of governance
rights when the firm seeks outside capital.48 But how does corporate
governance change once this initial allocation is set?49 Which actors push
firms to adopt new governance terms? Recent literature has considered the
distinctive role played by intermediaries, focusing principally on institutional
investors and hedge fund activists.50
Institutional intermediaries are especially important now that the
disintermediated capital market, on which the original contractarian account
is premised, has disappeared. Today, a substantial percentage of U.S. equity
is held by institutional investors.51 Many institutions are long-term investors
who hold the market through index funds, exchange-traded funds, and other
broadly diversified investment vehicles. They do not, typically, move into and
out of a stock based on corporate governance. This is not to say that
institutional investors are indifferent to corporate governance, especially in
their voting decisions.52 They are, however, subject to significant resource
47 See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text. The collective pressure of shareholders’
investment decisions triggers managers to adopt governance terms consistent with shareholder interests.
“It is almost as if there were an invisible hand.” EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 4.
48 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 293.
49 See, e.g., Klausner, supra note 26, at 1346 (distinguishing mid-stream governance changes
from the treatment of governance provisions at the initial public offering stage).
50 See, e.g., Martin Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, 43 SETON
HALL L. REV. 909, 914 (2013) (arguing that changes in the legal regime governing pension funds
has shifted U.S. corporate governance toward a shareholder primacy norm).
51 See BEN W. HEINEMAN, JR. & STEPHEN DAVIS, MILLSTEIN CTR. FOR CORP.
GOVERNANCE & PERFORMANCE, ARE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS PART OF THE PROBLEM OR
PART OF THE SOLUTION?: KEY DESCRIPTIVE AND PRESCRIPTIVE QUESTIONS ABOUT
SHAREHOLDERS’ ROLE IN U.S. PUBLIC EQUITY MARKETS 1 (2011), http://web.law.columbia.edu/
sites/default/files/microsites/millstein-center/80235_CED_WEB.pdf [http://perma.cc/G58Q-3ZYW].
52 See Stephen Choi et al., Who Calls the Shots? How Mutual Funds Vote on Director Elections, 3
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 35, 37-38 (2013) (exploring the voting behavior of mutual funds); John C.
Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
1277, 1317–28 (1991) (noting that institutional investors have “limited interest in corporate governance
issues . . . because the expected gains from most such governance issues are small, deferred, and
received by investors, while the costs are potentially large, immediate, and borne by money
managers”); Omari Scott Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill: The Imponderable Impact of Executive
Compensation Reform, 62 SMU L. REV. 299, 354 (2009) (“Institutional investors, despite having greater
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constraints, which often lead them to follow shortcuts and heuristics in
deciding how to vote on corporate governance issues.53
In a market dominated by largely passive and resource-constrained
institutional investors, third-party intermediaries play a large role in
manufacturing and modifying corporate governance terms. Gilson and Gordon
have modeled activist hedge funds as one such third-party intermediary.54 In
their account, activists function as arbitrageurs of undervalued governance
rights, creating value not by taking over the firm, but by persuading
institutional investors to support their position and, if necessary, their slate
of nominees.55 Activists thus function as governance intermediaries, bringing
governance change by mobilizing the institutional investor constituency.
Activists are not the only important intermediaries when it comes to
corporate governance reform. Indeed, the story of the golden leash
demonstrates that, in addition to activists, proxy advisors and corporate law
firms may perform an equally important role as governance intermediaries.
The dominant proxy advisory firm is ISS.56 Like activists, proxy advisors
exert influence by mobilizing institutional investors. Unlike activists, proxy
advisors have no ownership stake in the recommendations they make. Instead,
proxy advisors provide company-specific research and voting recommendations
to institutional investor clients, effectively allowing institutions to outsource
much of their portfolio monitoring function.57 In connection with these services,
proxy advisory firms communicate corporate governance policy positions and
viewpoints to their institutional investor clients. ISS’s policies have significant

capacity to monitor and gather information, may have too small a stake in a company or too limited
industry expertise to monitor it actively.”); Jennifer S. Taub, Able but Not Willing: The Failure of Mutual
Fund Advisers to Advocate for Shareholders’ Rights, 34 J. CORP. L. 843, 845-46 (2009) (“[T]he greater
the dependency of [mutual fund advisers] upon [corporate clients] for asset management business,
the less likely the fund family will be to support shareholder-sponsored governance resolutions.”).
53 See Choi et al., supra note 52, at 50-55.
54 Gilson & Gordon, supra note 20, at 901.
55 Id. at 897.
56 See JAMES R. COPLAND, MANHATTAN INST. CTR. FOR LEGAL POL’Y, PROXY MONITOR
2012: A REPORT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 3 (2012),
http://www.proxymonitor.org/pdf/pmr_04.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y7XX-H6KK]. The other major
proxy advisory firm is Glass Lewis. See id. at 23.
57 Stephen Choi et al., The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869,
870-71 (2010).
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influence on investors’ voting behavior.58 As a result, proxy advisors have been
subject to substantial criticism and even calls for regulatory oversight.59
Institutional investors do not treat every recommendation of proxy advisory
firms with equal regard. Proxy advisors have adopted elaborate voting policies
with regard to a great many corporate and social issues.60 These policy positions
often take the form of market-wide pronouncements on a particular issue,
such as the ISS pronouncement on the Wachtell Bylaw.61 Institutional investors
may disagree with the basis underlying a proxy advisor’s recommendation—
as they often do, for example, in the context of withhold recommendations in
director elections—in which case the recommendation will have little or no
effect on voting outcomes.62 On other issues, however, the proxy advisor’s
recommendation is largely outcome determinative.63
In addition to discussing activists, institutional investors, and their
advisors, our account illuminates the intermediary role played by corporate
law firms. The legal literature customarily treats lawyers as advocates or
counselors in particular cases or controversies, but some prominent law firms
play an important policy role as well. In the corporate law context, this is
especially true of Wachtell, which has a specific set of clients with an
identifiable perspective—acquisition targets and boards subject to unwelcome
attention from shareholder activists. Wachtell is particularly well-known for
inventing the poison pill and thereby fundamentally changing the tactics of
58 See Jie Cai et al., Electing Directors, 64 J. FIN. 2389, 2401 (2009) (finding negative ISS
recommendation reduced votes “FOR” the election of a director nominee by approximately twenty
percent); Choi et al., supra note 57, at 906 (“[W]e find that the impact of an ISS recommendation ranges
from 6% to 13% for the median company.”); James Cotter et al., ISS Recommendations and Mutual
Fund Voting on Proxy Proposals, 55 VILL. L. REV. 1, 55 (2010) (finding that institutions “voted in line with
ISS recommendations much more frequently than with contrary management recommendations”).
59 See, e.g., SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 20 (June 30, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/
cfslb20.htm [https://perma.cc/SL2N-F69N].
60 See, e.g., INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS. INC., 2014 U.S. PROXY VOTING SUMMARY
GUIDELINES (2014).
61 See infra notes 129–31 and accompanying text. By contrast, ISS at other times issues research
recommendations with regard to a shareholder vote at a particular company. See, e.g., CHRIS
CERNICH & NELSON SERACI, INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS. INC., ALLERGAN (AGN)—
CONSENT SOLICITATION BY PERSHING SQUARE TO CALL A SPECIAL MEETING 2 (2014),
http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/files/2014/09/iss-comparables.pdf [http://perma.cc/F6ADRNLM] (detailing ISS’s recommendation with respect to a special meeting at Allergan).
62 See, e.g., Yonca Ertimur et al., Understanding Uncontested Director Elections: Determinants
and Consequences 3 (June 9, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id-2447920 [http://perma.cc/SH44-M46X] (finding significant variation in voting outcomes
when ISS makes a withhold recommendation and relating that variation to shareholder consideration
of the rationale underlying the recommendation).
63 See Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical
Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557, 582-83 (2015) (finding that an ISS
recommendation for or against an acquisition transaction can influence approximately 15% to 23% of
the shareholder vote on a merger).
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hostile takeovers and defenses.64 But the firm is also influential through its
regular publication of public “client memos.”65
It was one such memorandum that led nearly three dozen firms to adopt
the Wachtell Bylaw in short order.66 Like the poison pill, the Wachtell Bylaw
could be adopted at any time through unilateral board action. Thus, like the
poison pill, the potential availability of the Bylaw had a market-wide effect
that was not limited to actual adopters.67
Wachtell and other similar law firms clearly exert a role in corporate
governance beyond the advising of individual clients in discrete circumstances.
They are, like proxy advisors and activist investors, governance intermediaries.
Unlike proxy advisors and activist investors, however, law firms exert their
governance leverage primarily on corporations and corporate boards rather
than institutional investors.
With Part I having reviewed the literature on each of these intermediary
roles in the adoption of corporate governance terms, the next Part turns to a
case study of this process in action.
II. THE CASE OF THE GOLDEN LEASH
A. Background
The golden leash has its roots in the evolution of hedge fund activism in
the United States. In the 1970s and 1980s, hostile control contests typically
involved an attempt by an acquirer to purchase an entire company.68 Legal
innovations such as the poison pill as well as economic developments that
increased the cost of financing takeovers shifted takeover strategy to the
proxy contest.69 At first, activists ran full slate proxy contests in which they

64 Name Partner Martin Lipton typically receives credit for the invention. See, e.g., Martin M.
Cohen, Note, “Poison Pills” as a Negotiating Tool: Seeking a Cease-Fire in the Corporate Takeover Wars,
1987 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 459, 460 n.3.
65 For example, in a set of famous memoranda from the height of the hostile takeover era, the
firm threatened to advise clients to reincorporate out of Delaware if the state did not allow boards
to employ takeover defenses. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 COLUM.
L. REV. 1931, 1959 & n.95 (1991) (quoting memoranda issued by Wachtell asserting that in light of
recent Delaware court decisions it may be necessary for corporations to “leav[e] Delaware for a more
hospitable state of incorporation” and suggesting that it may be “time to migrate out of Delaware”).
66 See infra Section III.C.
67 See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.
68 See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176-77 (Del.
1986); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949-50 (Del. 1985).
69 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (and What We Can Do About It), 26 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 491, 503-07 (2001) (explaining that the widespread use and validation of the poison pill
shifted unsolicited takeover attempts to proxy contests coupled with tender offers); Joseph A.
Grundfest, Just Say No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN.
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sought to obtain control of the target company by replacing all or a majority
of the board of directors.70 However, as further innovation in takeover
protection took root, most notably the poison pill–staggered board
combination, activists gradually shifted to partial slate elections.71 Partial slate
elections, in which the activist does not seek control but merely
representation on the board, typically in the form of two to four seats, have
now largely replaced control contests.72
There were several possible reasons for this shift. One was regulatory: in
1992, the SEC revised the federal proxy rules to allow shareholders to run a
short slate election contest.73 Another was increased support by shareholders
for short slate contests. The short slate election strategy offers activists the
opportunity to take their proposal for change into the boardroom and enables
their directors, if elected, to persuade the rest of the board to embrace the
activist agenda. At the same time, institutional investors and their advisors
seem to view short slate contests as presenting less of a threat of
destabilization than replacing the entire board.74 In addition, the incumbent
directors operate as a check on the merits of the activist proposal because the
activist nominees, even if elected to the board, cannot implement the activist’s
agenda without persuading their fellow directors of its merit. Perhaps as a

L. REV. 857, 860 n.6 (1993) (“Bidders, like tulips, must now sprout in the spring, with offers
orchestrated to coincide with the April-May cycle of annual board elections.”).
70 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards
Proxy Contests, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1071, 1074 (1990).
71 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory,
Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 890-92 (2002) (describing the powerful antitakeover
effect of a staggered board in combination with a poison pill); William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and
Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1403-05 (2007).
72 See SEC Grants No-Action Relief to Activist Shareholders Seeking to “Round Out” Short Slates with
Each Other’s Nominees, GIBSON DUNN (Apr. 2, 2009), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/
pages/SECGrantsNo-ActionReliefToActivistShareholdersSeekingtoRoundOutShortSlates.aspx
[http://perma.cc/F542-6NDG] (stating that running a “short slate” has become “the preferred
approach for dissidents seeking board representation”). This is not to say that contests to unseat the
entire board do not happen, just that they are rare. See, e.g., Julie Jargon et al., Starboard Succeeds in
Replacing Entire Darden Board: Hedge Fund to Have Two of Its Own Partners on Board of Olive Garden,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 10, 2014, 4:24 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/darden-shareholders-elect-all-12starboard-nominated-directors-1412949459 [http://perma.cc/75LG-N6PE] (reporting on Starboard’s
successful campaign to replace the entire Darden board through a proxy contest).
73 See Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No.
34-31326, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276 (Oct. 22, 1992) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249).
74 See MARC WEINGARTEN, SCHULTE, ROTH & ZABEL, SHORT SLATES, MAJORITY SLATES
AND FULL SLATES: STRATEGIC AND VOTING CONSIDERATIONS 2 (2008), http://www.srz.com/
files/News/a4b75e18-db59-4c29-9c3a-8b3856c73f5b/Preview/NewsAttachment/f4fba66e-93db-467d
-b2a5-92f6b8814405/filesfilesAI_Spring_2008_Weingarten_Short_Slates_Majority_Slates_Full_
Slates.pdf [http://perma.cc/8FFA-DPM3] (“[T]he hurdle to obtaining support from Risk
Metrics/Institutional Shareholder Services (‘ISS’) and the other proxy advisory firms is considerably
higher for a control slate than it is for a short slate.”).
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result of these advantages, activists have enjoyed high success rates in their
bids for short slate board representation.75
Even with short slate election contests, the identity of the activist
nominees can become a source of controversy. In the past, it was the norm for
hedge fund principals to serve as activist director candidates. Prominent
activists such as Bill Ackman, Carl Icahn, and Dan Loeb have frequently taken
seats on the boards of their target companies in an effort to advocate for their
proposed strategic changes.76 Critics meanwhile have questioned whether a
hedge fund representative can adequately serve the interests of all shareholders
or will instead function inappropriately as a “constituency director.”77 They
have also raised concerns that hedge fund principals will make improper use
of corporate information.78 In addition, particular hedge fund representatives
have been characterized as divisive presences on a corporate board and lacking
the ability to interact appropriately with the incumbent directors.79
Responding to this concern as well as the general preference for
independent directors by many institutional investors, some activists have

75 According to SharkRepellent, shareholder activists had a 73% success rate in board seat
campaigns in 2015, up from 60% in 2014. An Early Look at 2015 US Proxy Fight Statistics,
SHARKREPELLENT (June 8, 2015), https://www.sharkrepellent.net/request?an=dt.getPage&st=un
defined&pg=/pub/rs_20150608.html&rnd=486544 [https://perma.cc/ZJP9-QH4F].
76 See, e.g., Michael J. de la Merced, 2 Big Investors Get Their Say at J.C. Penney, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Jan. 24, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/24/2-big-investors-get-their-sayat-j-c-penney [http://perma.cc/3HP6-JWKE] (reporting Bill Ackman’s appointment to the board of
J.C. Penney); Michael J. de la Merced, Icahn to Get Boards Seats in Settlement with Manufacturer
Manitowoc, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Feb. 9, 2015), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/02/09/manit
owoc-to-give-icahn-board-seats-in-settlement [http://perma.cc/WX7H-CXZ8] (describing settlement
giving Carl Icahn seats on the boards of two Manitowoc companies); Antoine Gara & Nathan Vardi,
Billionaire Dan Loeb Wins Board Seats at Dow, His Second Victory this Week, FORBES (Nov. 21, 2014,
10:08 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2014/11/21/billionaire-dan-loeb-wins-boardseats-at-dow-his-second-victory-this-week [http://perma.cc/4W2E-HH2T] (recounting Dan Loeb’s
successful win of two board seats at Dow).
77 See, e.g., E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, How Many Masters Can a Director
Serve? A Look at the Tensions Facing Constituency Directors, 63 BUS. LAW. 761, 763 (2008) (expressing
concern over “individuals who may be elected to the board by . . . particular constituencies of the
corporation”); Steven Seiden, Calling Those with Fortitude: So You Need a Dissident Director, BUS. L.
TODAY, Jan.–Feb. 1999, at 29, 29 (arguing that “only independent directors with no connection to
the activist ought to be nominated by him”). Often the chief critic is the company itself which is
opposing this nominee. See Press Release, Forest Labs., Inc., Forest Laboratories Sends Letter to
Shareholders (July 16, 2012), http://news.frx.com/press-release/corporate-news/forest-laboratoriessends-letter-shareholders-0 [http://perma.cc/P69W-6U2M] (“[Daniel Ninivaggi] is a salaried
employee and President of Icahn Enterprises, and as such, you can fairly question whether he will
put your interests above the financial objectives of Icahn Enterprises.”).
78 See, e.g., David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Boardroom Confidentiality Under Focus, N.Y.
L.J., Jan. 23, 2014, at 5.
79 Cf. Third Point LLP v. Ruprecht, No. 9469-VCP, slip op. at 51 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014)
(stating in dictum that hedge fund activist Dan Loeb conducted himself in an “aggressive and
domineering manner . . . in relation to Sotheby’s”).
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chosen to nominate director candidates who are not employed by or affiliated
with the activist.80 Air Products took this approach to an extreme in its 2010
attempt to take over Airgas, nominating three director candidates who had
no ties at all to Air Products. Air Products then touted the independence of
its candidates as a strength in the election contest.81
The challenge for an activist in a short slate election is that, even if the
activist is successful in having its short slate nominees elected, there is no
guarantee that the activist nominees will be able to persuade the rest of the
board. The risk increases if the activist nominees are truly independent. Air
Products represents the extreme case. Not only did the Air Products
nominees fail to persuade the rest of the board to accept Air Products’ tender
offer, but the reverse happened; after being elected, the Air Products nominees
sided with the incumbent directors and voted against the takeover.82
The Airgas situation—a short slate campaign with truly independent director
candidates—thus presents a challenge for the activist. To be successful, the
activist must identify independent and well-qualified director nominees. The
activist must then provide those nominees—who are not employees of or
investors in the activist hedge fund—with sufficient motivation to go through
an election contest and, if elected, serve on a possibly divided and hostile
target company board. At the same time, the activist would like to provide its
nominees with an incentive to remain loyal to the activist’s agenda. To achieve
these objectives, several hedge funds developed novel pay packages—golden
leashes—to compensate their nominees in the context of proxy fights.
B. An Activist Innovation—The Golden Leash
In 2012, JANA, a New York-based hedge fund, acquired a significant
position in Agrium, a Canadian fertilizer manufacturer, and announced a

80 It is not always easy for activists to find independent directors willing to serve as activist
nominees. Accepting such a candidacy may tarnish the nominee’s reputation with issuers. See, e.g.,
JoAnn S. Lublin, Activists Enlist Help of Recruiters: Search Firms Gingerly Wade into Finding Potential
Directors for Dissident Slates, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424
127887324324404579045431388717494 [http://perma.cc/RB3W-YPKP] (explaining increasing use by
activists of director search firms to identify truly independent and qualified directors to temper the
“activists’ reputation as buccaneers”).
81 Steven M. Davidoff, A Case Study: Air Products v. Airgas and the Value of Strategic Judicial
Decision-Making, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 502, 513 (2012).
82 Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 88-89 (Del. Ch. 2011). This may have
been strategic on the part of the new directors. By appearing to join a majority that was inevitably
going to reject the Air Products offer, the new directors appeared to be willing to listen to the other
Airgas directors and could remain a part of the negotiation.
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proxy contest to elect five members to Agrium’s twelve member board.83 In
its proxy statement, JANA disclosed that, if its nominees were elected, they
would receive additional compensation paid directly by JANA.84 In addition
to a flat payment of $50,000 each, the JANA-nominated directors would
collectively be paid 2.6% of JANA’s net gain on its Agrium investment.85 At
the time of the proxy fight, JANA’s investment in Agrium was approximately
$1 billion, so the dissident nominees had the potential to be compensated
millions of dollars by the fund.86 These payments were far greater than
standard directors’ fees.87 This compensation was also derived from a
different source—from the activist hedge fund rather than from the company.88
Agrium responded by filing its own proxy solicitation materials in which
it termed the JANA pay plan a “golden leash” and attacked the arrangement
as “unheard of in Canada.”89 Agrium argued that the golden leashes
undermined the JANA nominees’ independence and were “structured to
83 Nadia Damouni & Rod Nickel, Exclusive: Activist Jana Digs In for Long Agrium Battle,
REUTERS (Oct. 26, 2012, 1:30 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/26/us-agrium-jana-idUS
BRE89P05Z20121026 [http://perma.cc/6M8X-C4MN].
84 JANA PARTNERS LLC, SOLICITATION BY AND ON BEHALF OF JANA PARTNERS LLC
FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE HOLDERS OF COMMON SHARES OF AGRIUM INC. 8 (2012), http://
www.infomine.com/index/pr/PB/25/44/PB254436.pdf [http://perma.cc/NKT5-ADSF].
85 Steven M. Davidoff, Upping the Ante in a Play for a Stronger Board, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK
(Apr. 2, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/04/02/upping-the-ante-in-a-play-for-a-stronger-b
oard [http://perma.cc/FTC6-J8Q6].
86 See Rob Gillies, Agrium Nominees Elected to the Board, YAHOO! (Apr. 9, 2013, 3:51 PM),
http://news.yahoo.com/agrium-nominees-elected-board-193008279.html [http://perma.cc/N9UJW2UL] (“The hedge fund spent more than $1 billion for a 7.5 percent stake in Agrium . . . .”).
87 See AGRIUM, NOTICE OF ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS AND
MANAGEMENT PROXY CIRCULAR 78 (2013) (stating that the incumbent Agrium directors received
on average $43,490 Canadian dollars plus $149,348 in incentives for their service in 2012, and that
the average director made $134,000 in annual cash and incentive compensation). See generally Steven
M. Davidoff et al., Do Outside Directors Face Labor Market Consequences? A Natural Experiment from
the Financial Crisis, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 53 (2014) (surveying total director compensation during
the period from 2006 to 2010 for the S&P 1500 and finding average director compensation to be
$133,000). It is worth noting, however, that the incumbent Agrium directors held tens of thousands
of shares of Agrium stock through option grants and that, as a result of these grants, they too stood
to receive millions of dollars in compensation if Agrium’s stock price increased substantially. See
AGRIUM, supra note 87, at 36 (stating that as of March 2012, eight of ten Agrium directors had more
than a million dollars of Agrium equity at risk, and that four of ten had over two million).
88 When Agrium raised this as a reason to oppose JANA’s nominees in the context of the proxy
fight, the director nominees defended the arrangement by noting that “[i]t is true that Jana bears
this expense, but that is true of every expense in this effort . . . . Despite Agrium’s misleading claims,
none of us will be bound by any duty other than our fiduciary duty as directors.” Lauren Krugel,
Agrium Wins bcIMC Support in Battle with Jana Partners, GLOBE & MAIL (Mar. 15, 2013, 5:24 PM),
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/agrium-wins-bcimc-support-in-battle-with-janapartners/article9838651 [http://perma.cc/2H8X-3YAE].
89 Press Release, Agrium, Agrium Urges Shareholders to Vote the White Proxy for Agrium’s
Director Nominees (Mar. 4, 2013), http://www.agrium.com/en/investors/news-releases/2013/agriumurges-shareholders-vote-white-proxy-agriums-director-nominees [http://perma.cc/L5SV-VUNT].
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incentivize short-term actions, even if they are taken at the expense of greater
long-term value.”90 JANA ultimately lost the election for reasons that likely
had little to do with the golden leash arrangements.91 The issue of the golden
leash, for Agrium at least, became moot.92
At around the same time, Elliott offered a similar compensation
arrangement to its dissident nominees to the board of Hess, an oil company.
Elliott’s nominees would receive $50,000 up front and an additional $30,000
for each percentage point by which Hess shares outperformed the stock of a
group of peer companies over a period of years, up to nine million dollars for
each director.93 Again, these payments were to be made by the nominating
hedge fund, not the company itself. If made, the payments could result in the
dissident directors being compensated more than either their peers on the
board or other directors generally.
Not surprisingly, as in the Agrium dispute, the pay arrangement came
under fire during the ensuing proxy fight.94 Unlike the prior situation,
however, the Elliott nominees reacted by waiving their right to the
compensation package.95 Although Hess initially argued that this concession
proved the underlying self-interest of Elliott’s nominees,96 the company

90 Id. In fact, Agrium engaged in some questionable tactics of its own, at least from a U.S.
perspective. For example, Agrium paid twenty-five cents per share to investment advisors whose
clients voted in support of the full Agrium slate, a common tactic in Canada, but one certainly
raising conflict issues. Stephen Erlichman, The Agrium Fight: Agrium Payments Don’t Pass the ‘Smell
Test,’ GLOBE & MAIL (July 4, 2013, 6:45 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-onbusiness/payments-dont-pass-the-smell-test/article13010420 [http://perma.cc/CXA6-MSC2].
91 See Ronald Barusch, Dealpolitik: Agrium Lesson for Activists: Don’t Underestimate the Adversary,
WALL ST. J.: DEAL J. (Apr. 12, 2013, 4:08 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2013/04/12/dealpolitikagrium-lesson-for-activists-dont-underestimate-the-adversary [http://perma.cc/TL89-YE9A] (describing
JANA as outgunned by Agrium’s aggressive tactics).
92 JANA was hardly gracious in its loss. Barry Rosenstein, a JANA managing partner and
nominee to the Agrium board, addressed the incumbent board at an annual meeting: “You are a
Board that proved that if you play dirty enough, violate all precepts of good corporate governance,
fair play, ethical behavior, and democracy, you can still lose the campaign but then barely
manufacture a victory after the voting is supposed to be over.” Id.
93 Hess Corp., Definitive Additional Materials (Schedule 14A) (Mar. 26, 2013).
94 See Press Release, Hess Corp., Hess Sends Letter to Shareholders (Mar. 26, 2013), http://
phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=101801&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1800473 [http://perma.cc/2
BHK-AUFW] (“We find the prospect of Paul Singer, a shareholder, potentially paying directors
millions of dollars in contingency fees for pre-determined outcomes to be highly troublesome from
a governance perspective, and have concerns about the Singer directors’ ability to act as fiduciaries
on behalf of all Hess shareholders.”).
95 Hess Corp., Soliciting Material Pursuant to § 240.14a-12 (Schedule 14A) (May 13, 2013).
96 Press Release, Hess Corp., Hess Comments on Elliott Letter: Notes that Elliott’s Nominees
Finally Have Acknowledged that Their Short-Term, Conflicted Compensation Agreement Was
Wrong (May 13, 2013), http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=101801&p=irol-newsArticle&I
D=1818618 [http://perma.cc/BS83-3U9S].
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eventually capitulated to shareholder pressure and settled with Elliott,
ultimately allowing three of the five nominees onto the board.97
Carl Icahn followed suit, nominating a candidate98 for the board of Forest
Laboratories (Forest)99 who stood to receive $65,000 per month for the proxy
contest as well as 1% of Icahn’s profits on Forest stock above $47.50 per share for
profits earned within thirty months of the candidate being elected to the board.100
Forest described this arrangement as creating “significant and obvious conflicts”
that would compromise the candidate’s independence and ability to represent
all stockholders.101 Forest ultimately elected one of Icahn’s candidates to the
board, but the candidate with the golden leash arrangement was not elected.102
Although golden leash compensation arrangements ultimately were not
triggered at Agrium, Hess, or Forest, the innovation attracted considerable
attention in the media and among legal commentators, leading to strong
arguments both for and against such arrangements.103 The most basic
argument in favor of activist compensation arrangements is that proxy
contests are expensive and time-consuming and can damage a dissident
nominee’s reputation; therefore, qualified independent nominees will avoid
them unless offered a significant inducement in the form of additional
compensation. For example, the JANA slate for Agrium included officers and
directors of publicly traded agriculture and chemical companies as well as a
97 Hess and Elliott Reach Resolution to End Proxy Contest, BUS. WIRE (May 16, 2013, 8:30 AM),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20130516005692/en/Hess-Elliott-Reach-Resolution-ProxyContest#.U5xhv7HGBo4 [http://perma.cc/6NJ9-X86B].
98 The candidate, Eric Ende, was one of four Icahn nominees in 2012. Press Release, Forest Labs.,
Inc., Forest Laboratories Sends Letter to Shareholders (July 16, 2012), http://news.frx.com/press-release/
corporate-news/forest-laboratories-sends-letter-shareholders-0 [http://perma.cc/288P-6CFU].
99 Icahn had waged an unsuccessful proxy contest at Forest the previous year. Michael J. de la
Merced, Forest Labs Defeats Icahn in Proxy Fight, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Aug. 18, 2011), http://deal
book.nytimes.com/2011/08/18/forest-labs-defeats-icahn-in-proxy-fight [http://perma.cc/FK99-HL75].
100 Press Release, Forest Labs., Inc., supra note 98; see also Paritosh Bansal & Lewis Krauskopf,
Icahn Dangles Bounty for Nominee in Forest Fight, REUTERS (June 29, 2012, 5:25 PM), http://
www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/29/us-forest-icahn-idUSBRE85S0RX20120629 [http://perma.cc/
H8PY-8QCZ]. The terms of the leash were disclosed in Icahn’s proxy statement. See Forest Labs.,
Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (July 23, 2012).
101 Press Release, Forest Labs., Inc., supra note 98.
102 David Benoit, Icahn Lands One Seat on Forest Labs Board, WALL ST. J.: DEAL J. (Aug. 15,
2012, 11:21 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2012/08/15/icahn-lands-one-seat-on-forest-labs-board
[http://perma.cc/DP8S-R236]. The following year, Forest agreed to nominate an additional Icahn
representative to its board to avoid a third election contest. Ransdell Pierson & Bill Berkrot, Forest
Labs to Add Icahn Rep to Board, Avert Proxy Fight, REUTERS (June 11, 2013, 2:44 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/11/us-forestlaboratories-icahn-idUSBRE95A0OZ20130611
[http://perma.cc/4WLY-ZQ5U].
103 For a detailed examination of these arguments and a defense of the golden leash, see
generally Edward M. Iacobucci, Special Compensation Arrangements for Dissident Directors in Proxy
Contests: A Policy Analysis, 55 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 365 (2014) and Yaron Nili, Servants of Two Masters?
The Feigned Hysteria over Activist-Paid Directors, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. (forthcoming 2016).
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Canadian former Member of Parliament and minister of agriculture.104 The
Elliott slate for Hess meanwhile consisted of petroleum company chief
executives and board members.105
Furthermore, the golden leash packages were structured to create
incentives for the activist nominees, once seated, to push the company to
outperform. Were the newly-seated directors successful in doing so, all
shareholders would have profited. Even better, from the unaffiliated
shareholders’ perspective, the cost of the incentive compensation was to be
borne entirely by the activist, not the company itself. Shareholders were thus
put in the position of free riders, enjoying the positive externality of the
nominees’ incentive to perform without bearing any of the cost.
The leading argument against activist compensation arrangements is that
such arrangements pose a threat to a director’s fiduciary duty by providing an
incentive for the director to favor the interests of the shareholder that is
paying him or her rather than the interests of all shareholders. A seated
nominee might seek to curry favor with the activist in hopes, perhaps, of
earning additional compensation. In those situations where the activist’s
interest conflicts with that of other shareholders, the special pay arrangement
might cause the director to push the activist’s agenda. It is worth pointing out
that most golden leash compensation arrangements, including the ones in
Hess, Agrium, and Forest, are hardwired. The activists had already agreed, in
a binding contract, to make the supplemental payments if their nominees,
once seated, hit the specified performance hurdles, leaving the activists with no
subsequent discretion as to whether or not to make the payments—the
payments would be required if the profit hurdles were achieved. As a result,
the nominees would have no need to curry favor with the activist.
Even if the promise to pay is binding and nondiscretionary, opponents
might still argue that the terms of the compensation arrangement are
problematic because they originate outside the firm and are set by a party
with no fiduciary duty to shareholders. In other words, the compensation
arrangement itself may not be in shareholders’ best interests. Opponents of
activism may argue that such arrangements do not in fact serve the interests of
all shareholders because they over-incentivize directors to push for short-term
returns over long-term profitability. Here the debate over activism recycles,
in slightly altered form, familiar tropes from the takeover debate.106 Emphasis
on short-term returns may result in greater risk taking or leverage or the

JANA PARTNERS LLC, supra note 84.
Hess Corp., supra note 93.
See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for
Hidden Value, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 521, 521-23 (2002) (outlining debate about whether takeovers are
value-increasing).
104
105
106
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avoidance of investment opportunities with longer time horizons. Normally,
the board of directors is thought to counterbalance the short-term interests
of such shareholders. However, if these shareholders are able to put their
nominees on the board and use potentially lucrative pay packages to ensure
that those nominees continue to focus on short-term rewards, the activists
damage the long-term health of the corporation.
No corporate authority has passed judgment on whether golden leash
compensation arrangements are good for shareholders. The terms of the
debate were set by non-fiduciaries with their own (arguably short-term)
agendas.107 In the context of a takeover, at least, minority shareholders have
the chance to sell for a control premium. In the context of activism, minority
shareholders do not receive a control premium but are nevertheless subject to
the activist’s managerial whims. Thus, according to this view, it is problematic
to have a fiduciary’s compensation set by a nonfiduciary notwithstanding the
binding, nondiscretionary nature of its terms.
C. The Advisors Strike Back
On May 9, 2013, Wachtell publicly released a memorandum attacking the
golden leash. The memorandum recited several of the above-described
arguments against activist compensation arrangements and cited to several
other commentators who had criticized the use of the golden leash.108 The
memorandum went on to suggest that issuers could protect themselves from
the risk of nominees coming forward under the terms of such preferential
compensation packages by adopting a bylaw prohibiting golden leash
arrangements.109 The memorandum went so far as to propose a model golden
leash bylaw:
No person shall qualify for service as a director of the Corporation if he or
she is a party to any compensatory, payment or other financial agreement,
arrangement or understanding with any person or entity other than the
Corporation, or has received any such compensation or other payment from
any person or entity other than the Corporation, in each case in connection
with candidacy or service as a director of the Corporation; provided that
agreements providing only for indemnification and/or reimbursement of
out-of-pocket expenses in connection with candidacy as a director (but not,
for the avoidance of doubt, in connection with service as a director) and any

107 Hedge funds may be short-term oriented due to the need to demonstrate performance to
their investors, or as a result of liquidity concerns. Other shareholders, not subject to these
considerations, may take a longer view of corporate performance.
108 Lipton, supra note 11.
109 Id.
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pre-existing employment agreement a candidate has with his or her employer
(not entered into in contemplation of the employer’s investment in the
Corporation or such employee’s candidacy as a director), shall not be
disqualifying under this bylaw.110

The bylaw, as proposed, was written to cover a broader range of
compensation arrangements than those reflected in the Elliott and JANA
golden leashes. It disqualified a nominee who received any compensation in
connection with his or her candidacy or service (other than indemnification
or reimbursement of expenses) from a source other than the corporation
itself. Thus, not only would the rich incentive packages offered to nominees
in cases like Agrium and Hess lead to nominee disqualifications under such a
bylaw, but so too would small cash payments intended simply to induce
dissident nominees to go through the painful process of a proxy fight.
Wachtell defended the legality of the disqualification bylaw by pointing
to the statutory authority of boards to “prescribe other qualifications for
directors” through a charter or bylaw provision.111 The firm further argued
that the business judgment rule should protect the decision to adopt such a
bylaw or that, should a heightened standard of review be found to apply, the
board’s decision “should withstand scrutiny as a measured response to the
threat posed by these inappropriate schemes.”112
In the months following the release of the Wachtell Memorandum, the
boards of thirty-two issuers amended their bylaws to adopt provisions
prohibiting golden leash compensation arrangements.113 Most of the bylaws
were similar or identical to the Wachtell model, and their rapid adoption
threatened to limit activists’ ability to use golden leashes.
The adoption of these bylaws triggered a response by ISS. ISS, the
predominant proxy advisory firm, provides information and recommendations
to its institutional investor clients in connection with their voting decisions.114
Notably, ISS’s voting recommendations are based, in part, on its evaluation
of an issuer’s corporate governance.115 In its proxy voting policy guidelines,
ISS explains that its voting recommendations “are intended to assist
Id. (emphasis omitted).
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (2015). The legality of the bylaw, however, is unclear;
while Delaware courts have generally upheld a range of takeover defenses, they have applied greater
scrutiny to board actions that interfere with the electoral process. See Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp.,
564 A.2d 651, 652, 655 (Del. Ch. 1988) (holding that board actions taken primarily to interfere with
the shareholder franchise must have “compelling justification”).
112 Lipton, supra note 11.
113 See infra Table I.
114 See Proxy Voting Services, ISS, http://www.issgovernance.com/governance-solutions/proxy-v
oting-services [http://perma.cc/G93M-4EUH] (last visited Nov. 21, 2015).
115 See ISS Global Voting Principles, ISS, http://www.issgovernance.com/policy-gateway/iss-glob
al-voting-principles [http://perma.cc/2J4V-7R45] (last visited Nov. 21, 2015).
110
111
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institutional investors in meeting their fiduciary requirements with respect
to voting by promoting long-term shareholder value creation and risk
mitigation at their portfolio firms through support of responsible global
corporate governance practices.”116
On November 12, 2013, ISS recommended that shareholders withhold
their votes from the members of the Nominating and Governance Committee
of Provident, a firm that had adopted the disqualification bylaw.117 ISS stated
that it constituted a “material governance failure” for the Provident board to
adopt a bylaw that significantly impacted shareholder rights without seeking
shareholder input.118 As ISS explained, the disqualification bylaw would
“unduly restrict investors’ ability to nominate and elect otherwise qualified
individuals via a proxy contest.”119
On November 26, 2013, ISS released a further explanation of its position.
In a public memorandum, ISS identified “the potentially chilling effect of
this bylaw on the quality of dissident candidates in future proxy contests.”120
Hence, according to ISS, the bylaw could “have a detrimental effect on the
quality of dissident candidates, without providing shareholders any reasonable
benefit.”121 Importantly, ISS signaled that its concern about golden leash
bylaws extended beyond the single case of Provident. In the memorandum,
ISS included a list of all of those companies known to it to have adopted such
bylaws, implicitly suggesting that these companies could expect future
withhold recommendations if they did not reconsider their bylaws.122
Not every ISS policy position generates a voting response by investors.123
Nevertheless, investors responded to the concerns ISS raised regarding the
Wachtell Bylaw. On November 27, 2013, Provident announced the voting
results from its annual meeting.124 Provident’s director nominees received a
withhold vote of 34%.125 High withhold votes are of particular concern, even in
uncontested elections, because they signal widespread investor dissatisfaction.126
116 2015 Policy Information, ISS, http://www.issgovernance.com/policy-gateway/2015-policy-in
formation [http://perma.cc/HZZ4-KU7K] (last visited Nov. 21, 2015).
117 ISS PROXY ADVISORY SERVS., REPORT ON PROVIDENT FINANCIAL HOLDINGS, INC.
(Nov. 12, 2013). The report was released after the close of business.
118 Id. at 1.
119 Id.
120 CERNICH ET AL., supra note 12, at 2.
121 Id.; see also ISS, DIRECTOR QUALIFICATION/COMPENSATION BYLAW FAQS 1 (2014)
[hereinafter ISS FAQS] (“The adoption of restrictive director qualification bylaws without
shareholder approval may be considered a material failure of governance because the ability to elect
directors is a fundamental shareholder right.”).
122 CERNICH ET AL., supra note 12, at 2; see also ISS FAQS, supra note 121, at 1.
123 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
124 Provident Fin. Holdings, Inc., Annual Meeting Results (Form 8-K) (Nov. 26, 2013).
125 Id.
126 Choi et al., supra note 52, at 63.
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A 34% withhold vote would certainly be characterized as “high,”127 and boards
often respond to high withhold votes by complying with activists’ requests.128
On January 13, 2014, ISS released new policy updates formalizing its
position.129 In those updates, ISS announced that it would treat the Wachtell
Bylaw, along with any other bylaw amendment unilaterally adopted by the
board that had the effect of materially diminishing shareholder rights, as a
“material failure of [corporate] governance.”130 Barring extraordinary
circumstances, ISS now recommends withhold for directors of companies
exhibiting a material failure of corporate governance.131 ISS, in other words,
recommends withhold against directors who adopt the Wachtell Bylaw.
Investors took the ISS position seriously, not only at Provident, but also
at other companies that had adopted the Wachtell Bylaw. Table I sets forth
the results of director elections at companies that had adopted the Wachtell
Bylaw and held a shareholder meeting prior to repealing the Bylaw. The
middle two columns report the averages of the percentage of yes votes cast
for each director up for election at the given fiscal year’s annual meeting.

127 Id.; see also Diane Del Guercio et al., Do Boards Pay Attention When Institutional Investor
Activists “Just Vote No”?, 90 J. FIN. ECON. 84, 89 (2008) (describing “withhold” votes of more than
20% as “substantial”).
128 Del Guercio et al., supra note 127, at 89 (“[A] strong showing of withheld support increases
the probability that the board will comply with activists’ requests.”).
129 ISS FAQS, supra note 121, at 1.
130 Id.
131 Id.
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Table I shows that companies that did not immediately repeal the
Wachtell Bylaw typically suffered a significant reduction in yes votes cast as
a result of increased withhold votes. The median number of yes votes cast for
these companies was 70.75% compared to 96.98% for those that had repealed
the Wachtell Bylaw by the time of the shareholder vote. This difference is
highly statistically significant at the 1% confidence level based on a Wilcoxon
rank-sum test. The difference appears to be driven by the ISS position on the
Wachtell Bylaw. The average votes cast for those companies with significant
withhold votes in 2014 differ from the 2013 figures for all but two of those
companies.132 For example, Chatham Lodging Trust had an average yes vote
for its directors of 80.52% in 2013 compared to 53.43% in 2014 when the
Wachtell Bylaw was in effect. Chatham Lodge subsequently repealed its
golden leash bylaw.
Issuers responded rapidly to the ISS warning and the demonstrated
shareholder support for the ISS position. By May 20, 2014, twenty-eight of
thirty-two companies had retracted the bylaw in whole or in part, many on
the eve of their shareholder meetings. Even Wachtell acknowledged that
issuer adoption of the bylaws was risky in light of both the ISS position and
widespread institutional opposition.133 As of January 15, 2016 only three
issuers retain director compensation bylaws.134
The golden leash, by contrast, is far from dead. In November 2014, activist
shareholder Third Point disclosed that it had agreed to a golden leash
arrangement with its two nominees for the Dow board of directors.135 Third
Point’s nominees would each receive $250,000 for agreeing to serve as a
nominee and an additional $250,000 if elected, which would be invested in
Dow stock.136 In addition, each nominee would receive two additional cash
payments from Third Point based on the appreciation of approximately
400,000 shares of Dow common stock following October 2, 2014.137 Dow and
Third Point settled the matter, avoiding a public proxy contest, on terms that
132 We note that National Fuel Gas Co., First Reliance Bancshares, and Entropic Communications,
Inc. all had below-average levels of institutional ownership.
133 See Martin Lipton, ISS Addresses Dissident Director Compensation Bylaw, HARV. L. SCH. F.
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Nov. 21, 2013), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/11/21/
iss-addresses-dissident-director-compensation-bylaw [http://perma.cc/4MRP-NNFB]; see also Holly
J. Gregory, Using Board-Adopted Bylaws to Reduce Corporate Threats, PRAC. L. (July 1, 2014), http://
us.practicallaw.com/6-572-8667 (noting that “some large institutional shareholders, the Council of
Institutional Investors (CII) and key proxy advisors have expressed concerns” over the adoption of
the Wachtell Bylaw).
134 See supra Table I. Entropic Communications was acquired on April 30, 2015.
135 David Benoit & Joann S. Lublin, Third Point Revives ‘Golden Leash’ Pay Plan in Dow Chemical
Fight, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 16, 2014, 4:00 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/third-point-revives-gold
en-leash-pay-plan-in-dow-chemical-fight-1416171616 [http://perma.cc/T5HV-ZUYB].
136 Id.
137 Id.
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involved Dow’s agreement to add Third Point’s nominees to the board as well
as two additional independent directors.138 Under the terms of the agreement,
the Third Point nominees kept their compensation packages, making them
the first sitting directors compensated pursuant to a golden leash.139
Moreover, in the February 2015 attack on General Motors by a group of
four activist hedge funds, the activists disclosed that their nominee, Harry
Wilson, would “receive a percentage of the group’s profits from their
investment in GM.”140 The Wilson golden leash was novel in that it consisted
of separate contracts with each of the four hedge funds, and each contract had
different terms.141 The GM contest was settled when GM agreed to buy back
$5 billion worth of stock and Wilson did not receive a board position.142
Nonetheless, the golden leash lives.
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The saga of the golden leash, the Wachtell Bylaw, and the ISS
recommendation presents a natural experiment to test how investors value
corporate governance. We begin, in Sections A and B, by analyzing the thirtytwo companies that had adopted the Wachtell Bylaw to determine if there is
any clear pattern to explain their actions. In Section C, we then conduct time
series analysis of the share prices of the thirty-two companies around principal
dates surrounding the adoption and repeal of the Wachtell Bylaw. Our goal is
to discern if investors value these governance changes, and if so, whether they
assign them negative or positive values. Finally, in Section D, we consider the
effects of the Wachtell Bylaw on a wider set of firms subject to activist attack.
A. Data Description
We obtained from ISS a list of companies that adopted a Wachtell Bylaw
on or after May 9, 2013, the date Wachtell first proposed a model director
compensation bylaw. To confirm that no other corporations belong in this list,
we searched 10-K Wizard for bylaw amendments addressing director
compensation; we then cross-checked the companies against a similar list that
Innisfree, a proxy solicitation service, had compiled and provided to us. We
138 David Benoit & Joann Lublin, Dow Chemical, Loeb Settle Board Dispute, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 21, 2014, 1:10 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/dow-chemical-third-point-settle-board-dispu
te-1416578708 [http://perma.cc/2Z9Z-J3EX].
139 Id.
140 Press Release, Gen. Motors, supra note 18.
141 Mark Rogers, GM, Harry Wilson, and the Disturbing Rise of the Golden Leash, FORBES
LEADERSHIP F. (Mar. 11, 2015, 2:31 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesleadershipforum/20
15/03/11/gm-harry-wilson-and-the-disturbing-rise-of-the-golden-leash [http://perma.cc/JR9P-CRLG].
142 Id.
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confined our search to the period from May 8, 2013, the date of the Wachtell
Memorandum, until November 27, 2013, the date when Provident published
the voting results for its annual meeting. We excluded companies that
adopted the bylaw in conjunction with an initial public offering or as a
prelude to being spun off from a parent company. The majority of companies
adopting a bylaw during this time period used the Wachtell language. We
arrived at a list of thirty-two companies.
We also obtained from ISS a list of all companies that subsequently
repealed their director compensation bylaw. We confirmed that there were no
other repeals by searching the 10-K Wizard database, confining our search to
any repeals implemented between November 26, 2013 and June 30, 2014. Our
search returned a list of twenty-seven companies.
We then searched the SEC EDGAR database to confirm the date that
each company publicly filed its disclosure of an adoption or repeal.
Incorporation data for each of these companies is obtained from the EDGAR
database. Institutional Ownership information is obtained from Thomson
Reuters while information on staggered boards and shareholder activism is
obtained from FactSet SharkRepellent.143
We measured activism by searching the FactSet SharkRepellent database
for any proposal by an institutional shareholder for substantive changes to
corporate organization or operations from May 8, 2012 (one year prior to the
Wachtell Memorandum) through November 25, 2014 (the one year anniversary
from the day before the Provident annual meeting). Voting results and
majority voting policies are also obtained from the FactSet database as well
as from filings in the SEC EDGAR database. Accounting information is
obtained from Compustat. Stock price information is obtained from the Center
for Research in Security Prices database and Yahoo! Finance. Compensation
data is obtained from Execucomp. Institutional Ownership information is
obtained from Thomson Reuters. Finally, information on staggered boards
and shareholder activism is obtained from Factset SharkRepellent.
B. Analysis—Adopters and Repealers
In this subsection, we examine the characteristics of the thirty-two
companies that adopted the Wachtell Bylaw. Table II, Panel A describes
certain accounting and compensation data for these companies.

143 FactSet SharkRepellent is a database which records activists’ actions and other information
concerning takeover defenses and shareholder voting. See generally SHARKREPELLENT, https://
www.sharkrepellent.net [https://perma.cc/C3R8-QNGM] (last visited Nov. 21, 2015).
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Table II: Sample Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Accounting and Compensation Information ($MM)144

Assets
Revenues
Market Cap.
Net Income
ROA
Total CEO
Comp.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Median

75th %

$16,884
$4076
$7162
$256
0.023

$62,278
$5732
$9939
$657
0.117

Min.
$295
$15
$8
-$1185
-0.364

25th %
$1154
$665
$604
$3
0.005

$3423
$2549
$3961
$96
0.042

$7298
$4944
$8087
$403
0.074

$355,408
$29,402
$43,087
$2125
0.227

Max

$7.182

$5.935

$.260

$2.235

$6.354

$8.966

$23.294

There is no pattern in terms of size, income, or revenue linking the
companies which adopt these bylaws. The median market capitalization of
these companies as of year-end 2013 is $3.961 billion but the mean market
capitalization is $7.162 billion, with a standard deviation of $9.939 billion,
which indicates a significant right-skewed range of size for the companies in our
sample. Similarly, the assets and revenue figures for the sample have a wide
range which is right-skewed. Companies in our sample have, as of year-end
2013, median total assets of $3.423 billion. The mean asset size for companies in
our sample is $16.884 billion and the standard deviation is $62.278 billion. The
median revenue of these companies in fiscal year 2013 is $2.549 billion with a
standard deviation of $5.732 billion and a mean of $4.076 billion.
The majority of companies in our sample are profitable, and the median
net income for fiscal year 2013 for these companies is $96 million. To further
explore the profitability of these companies, we calculated their return on assets
(ROA). ROA measures profitability relative to total assets by dividing net
income by total assets. The average ROA in fiscal year 2013 for the companies
in our sample is 2.3%, and the median is 4.2%, which is below the average for
companies in the Russell 2000 index.145 In our sample, the median chief
executive officer (CEO) compensation for the last fiscal year prior to
adoption of an amendment is $6.354 million, and the average is $7.182 million.
Institutional ownership is one factor that may influence the adoption of
director compensation bylaws. Low institutional ownership may provide

144 All accounting numbers are for fiscal year 2013. All numbers except ROA are in millions of
U.S. dollars. Market Capitalization is as of year-end 2013. ROA is return on assets measured as Net
Income divided by Total Assets for the fiscal year 2013. Total CEO Compensation is as recorded in
the company’s SEC filing for the annual meeting held immediately prior to the adoption of the
bylaw and prepared in accordance with SEC rules.
145 See RUSSELL INVS., SMALL CAP PERSPECTIVES: RUSSELL 2000 INDEX QUARTERLY
ANALYSIS 10 (2013), http://www.methodologymatters.com/pdfs/R2000%20Small%20Cap%20Persp
ectives%204Q13%20FINAL%20POSTED.pdf [http://perma.cc/LU5P-MYF4] (“Profitability as
measured by return on assets (ROA) ended the year at approximately 5.1% . . . .”).
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companies leeway to take actions which might be disfavored by shareholders.
If institutional ownership is low, there is no concentrated shareholder base
which can act effectively to overcome the free rider problem of dispersed
shareholder ownership. On the other hand, companies with a high number of
institutional owners may wish to adopt these bylaws because they can prevent
a small number of shareholders from supporting a shareholder activist. Panel
B sets forth information on institutional ownership in our sample.
Table II: Sample Descriptive Statistics
Panel B: Institutional Share Ownership146

Total Inst. Ownership %
Top 5 Inst. Ownership
Top 10 Inst. Ownership
Max Single Inst.
Ownership

Mean Std. Dev. Min.

25th %

Median

75th %

Max

66.88%
26.00%
36.60%

17.95%
6.90%
10.23%

15.74%
8.78%
11.49%

61.69%
21.97%
28.82%

69.94%
27.06%
36.79%

78.74%
29.62%
43.97%

92.60%
41.86%
59.91%

8.28%

2.54%

3.39%

6.37%

8.39%

10.03%

14.00%

The median institutional ownership for the companies in our sample as
of year-end 2013 is 69.94%, showing a high level of institutional involvement.
The maximum level of institutional ownership for a firm in our sample is
92.6%. In the sample, the median ownership of Top 5 Institutional
Ownership—the amount held by the top five institutional holders—is
27.06%. There are no controlling shareholders in our sample and the
maximum amount held by a single institutional holder for the median firm is
8.39%, with a maximum of 14% of the company. Panel C of Table II shows
other aspects of corporate governance.

146 Total Institutional Ownership % is the percentage of total institutional ownership. Top 5
Institutional Ownership is the percentage ownership of the five largest institutional owners. Top 10
Institutional Ownership is the percentage ownership of the ten largest institutional owners.
Maximum Institutional Ownership is the percentage ownership of the largest institutional owner.
Institutional ownership for each of these variables is as of the year-end 2013.
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Table II: Sample Descriptive Statistics
Panel C: Corporate Governance147

DE Incorp.
Staggered Board
Activism

Number

%

15
18
4

46.88%
56.26%
12.50%

Companies incorporated in Delaware have been found to trade at a
premium as compared to other companies.148 This may be due to self-selection
bias; that is, better companies may opt to incorporate in Delaware. But, it
also may be that Delaware companies have historically traded at a premium
due to the better laws and corporate governance apparatus that Delaware
arguably provides.149 Approximately 47% of our sample (fifteen companies)
is incorporated in Delaware.
A staggered board has been found to reduce firm value around the time
of its adoption.150 For these and other reasons, it has been opposed by
corporate governance advocates and proxy advisory services, and may be an
indicator of poor corporate governance practices. 151 In recent years this has
147 As discussed in Section II.A, supra, activism is measured by whether an institutional
shareholder brought a proposal for substantive changes to corporate organization or operations after
January 1, 2010, as recorded in the Factset Sharkrepellent database.
148 See Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 527 (2001)
(“I find that Delaware firms are worth more than similar firms incorporated elsewhere . . . .”). But
see Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32, 57 (2004)
(reporting evidence that the results found by Professor Daines did not continue over a later time
period); K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The Financial Value of Corporate Law: Evidence
from (Re)-Incorporation 47 (Oct. 14, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2519238 [http://perma.cc/T96W-PY86] (“In the time series the Delaware reincorporation effect has
a negative association with firm value, while reincorporation into Managerial States[, or
management friendly jurisdictions,] has a positive association with firm value.”).
149 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate
Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1064 (2000) (describing possible reasons for the superiority of
Delaware law, including the benefits of the Delaware courts).
150 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 71, at 939 (finding that having staggered boards reduces
shareholder returns by 8-10% “in the nine months after a hostile bid is launched”); see also Cohen &
Wang, supra note 46, at 628 (“We find evidence consistent with market participants viewing the
antitakeover force of staggered boards as bringing about, and not merely reflecting, reduced
shareholder value.”).
151 See Cohen & Wang, supra note 46, at 628 (“Certain institutional investors have over time
become increasingly opposed to staggered boards.”). The repeal of staggered boards is responsive,
in part, to the Shareholder Rights Project at Harvard Law School. See Daniel M. Gallagher & Joseph
A. Grundfest, Did Harvard Violate Federal Securities Law? The Campaign Against Classified Boards of
Directors 22-24 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance, Working Paper Series No. 199, 2014), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2536586 [http://perma.cc/JJ4E-G73E] (discussing the impact of the Harvard project on the
trend for S&P 500 companies to repeal staggered boards).
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led many S&P 500 companies to “destagger” and repeal their staggered
boards. As of 2013, only 9.75% of S&P 500 companies had a staggered
board.152 However, this number rises to 50.66% of the Russell 2000 and
41.96% of the Russell 3000.153 In our sample approximately 56%, or eighteen
companies, have a staggered board which is above all three metrics.
One spur to adopting director compensation bylaws may be an ongoing
or recent encounter with a shareholder activist.154 We measured activism by
searching the Factset SharkRepellent database for any proposal by an
institutional shareholder for substantive changes to corporate organization or
operations brought after January 1, 2012, but before release of the Wachtell
Memorandum, with respect to the companies in our sample. We found that
approximately 12.5% of our sample had an activist event under these
parameters.155 This is significantly higher than the general rates of activism
for the S&P 500, Russell 2000, and Russell 3000 companies as measured by
Factset SharkRepellent. Table III sets forth more in-depth information
concerning shareholder activism and the companies in our sample for the
time period from May 8, 2012 (one year prior to the Wachtell Memorandum)
through November 25, 2014 (approximately one year after the shareholder
vote for Provident Financial).156

SHARKREPELLENT, supra note 143.
Id.
See infra Table III.
The types of activism include campaigns to maximize shareholder value, efforts to obtain
board representation and acquisition activity.
156 Notably, Table III only reports activist activity that rises to the level reflected in the
SharkRepellent database. We note that media reports during this time period reflected rumors of
activism or some lesser level of activist activity for these companies. For example, Eastman Chemical
was rumored to be a potential JANA activism target in October 2013. Stephen Taub, Taking Barry
Rosenstein up on his Teaser, INSTITUTIONAL INV.’S ALPHA (Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.institutional
investorsalpha.com/Article/3266536/Taking-Barry-Rosenstein-Up-on-His-Teaser.html [http://perma.
cc/55VK-7VBH]. Similarly, in March 2013, the media reported that Marathon Oil’s intended CEO
resigned amidst a wave of shareholder rebellions in the oil and gas industry. Jeff Green et al.,
Marathon Said to Join Oil CEO Search as Bid War Looms, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Mar. 4, 2013, 10:46 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-03-04/marathon-said-to-join-oil-ceo-search-as-bidwar-looms [http://perma.cc/H9RZ-QUPX]. This activism may have been a factor motivating the
adoption of the Wachtell Bylaw. It is difficult, however, to gauge the potential economic significance of
activist activity based on rumors reported by the media, which may contribute to the market’s inability
to price the significance of the bylaw adoption at these 32 companies. See, e.g., Anna Prior, Icahn Denies
Having Stake in Peabody Energy, WALL ST. J.: MONEYBEAT (May 30, 2013, 1:28 PM), http://
blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/05/30/icahn-denies-having-stake-in-peabody-energy [http://perma.
cc/Y7JT-ZY9A] (reporting that Icahn denied the rumors that he had acquired a stake in Peabody).
152
153
154
155
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Table III: Incidence of Significant Shareholder Activism
(May 8, 2012 through November 25, 2014)

Name of Company
Marathon Oil Corp.
FBR & Co.
Rockwell Automation, Inc.
Nat’l Fuel Gas Co.
McGraw Hill Fin., Inc.
Monmouth Real Estate Inv. Corp.
UMH Props., Inc.
Tibco Software, Inc.
Halliburton Co.
First Reliance Bancshares, Inc.
Peabody Energy Corp.
Provident Fin. Holdings, Inc.
Invacare Corp.
Schnitzer Steel Indus., Inc.
Service Corp. Int’l
Insperity, Inc.
Whitewave Foods Co.
Centene Corp.
Wynn Resorts Ltd.
Joy Glob., Inc.
Wayne Sav. Bancshares, Inc. (DE)
Entropic Commc’ns, Inc.
Eastman Chem. Co.
C. R. Bard, Inc.
Alexion Pharm., Inc.
Leggett & Platt, Inc.
Penn Nat’l Gaming, Inc.
Chatham Lodging Trust
Int’l Game Tech.
WPX Energy, Inc.
Key Energy Servs., Inc.
Timken Co.

Activist Event
Prior to Wachtell
Bylaw Adoption
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No

Activist Event
After Wachtell
Bylaw Adoption
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No

Notably, while these companies experienced a high rate of shareholder
activism before their adoption of the Wachtell Bylaw, they also experienced
shareholder activism at the same rate thereafter. This may mean that
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companies adopted the Wachtell Bylaw in anticipation of future activism.
Still, based on the SharkRepellent data, there appears to be no discernable
pattern in the adoption of the Wachtell Bylaw.
C. Price Effects
For each of the thirty-two companies—listed in Tables I and III above—
that had adopted the Wachtell Bylaw, we examined the wealth effects of
firm-specific decisions to adopt and repeal a golden leash bylaw. Table IV sets
forth our cross-sectional event studies for companies adopting and repealing
the Wachtell Bylaw.
Table IV: Event Studies of Adoption and Repeal Dates
Adoptions
Constant

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.003
(0.657)

-0.012
(0.135)

0.004
(0.306)

-0.004
(0.430)

0.019
(0.141)

DE Incorp.
N
R2

Repeals

32
0.00%

32
7.24%

0.016**
(0.036)
27
0.00%

27
16.49%

A cross-sectional event study examines the effect of share price
movements for a set of firms over a single period of time. We conducted the
analysis by calculating the excess returns of each company on the date of their
adoption of a director compensation bylaw over the three day period from the
date of adoption against the Russell 2000 index.157 The three-day period
includes the trading days before and after the relevant date. Excess returns
are the amount by which a company in our sample had returns that were
different than the Russell 2000 Index. We selected this index because it most
comports with the characteristics of the companies in our sample. We
hypothesized that if golden leash compensation arrangements facilitate valueincreasing shareholder activism, companies that adopt the Wachtell Bylaw
would experience a share price decline upon adoption. Alternatively, if golden
leash arrangements are bad for issuers—consistent with the position
articulated by target company management and Wachtell—we would expect
to see a share price increase upon adoption of a bylaw.
157 Our analysis was conducted in accordance with Kothari & Warner. S.P. Kothari & Jerold
B. Warner, The Econometrics of Event Studies, in 1 HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE FINANCE 3 (2007).
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Columns 1 and 2 examine the share price returns of adopting companies.
In column 1 we regress these excess returns to determine whether there is a
statistically significant price movement.158 In other words, in general, did
companies adopting the golden leash experience a statistically significant
share price movement? We then regressed in column 2 the excess returns
against the independent variable Delaware incorporation expressed by DE
Incorp.159 This allowed us to examine whether share prices of Delaware
companies in particular, a place known for its well-ordered corporate law,
experienced any unique movement.
We found in column 1 that the coefficient for the returns upon adoption
is negative for the entire sample, indicating a decline in value for companies
that adopt a Wachtell Bylaw. However, the coefficient is not statistically
significant. In column 2 the coefficient for Delaware companies is positive
meaning that these companies experience a share price gain upon adoption
of a Wachtell Bylaw, but again this variable is not statistically significant at
conventional levels.
We thus did not find that the adoption of a Wachtell Bylaw had a
statistically significant effect on a company’s share price either for the sample
as a whole or for Delaware companies. This result is inconsistent with each
of our hypotheses—that is, first, that we would witness some market reaction
on each of our event dates and second, that the reaction would be negative on
May 9, 2013 but positive on November 27, 2013.
There are several possible explanations for this null finding. The sample
size may be too small, or the adoption may send countervailing signals that
cancel each other out. For instance, adoption of the bylaw may signal to the
market that the issuer’s board anticipates future activist activity, which might
lead to the higher share prices are typically associated with anticipation of
activism. On the other hand, adoption may signal a corporation’s unwillingness
to cooperate with such an activist, or otherwise imply governance practices
which the market may view as value-decreasing. Because these effects run in
opposing directions, they may cancel each other out. To further explore this
hypothesis, we ran an unreported model including the independent variable
shareholder activism which reflects whether the company experienced any type
of shareholder activism during the one year period before the Wachtell
Memorandum through November 25, 2014 (the day before the first
anniversary of the Provident meeting).160 We found no statistical significance

P-values from robust standard errors are shown below the coefficients in parentheses.
The independent variable DE Incorp. is added and is coded 1 if the company is incorporated
in Delaware and 0 otherwise.
160 This variable is coded 1 if there is any type of shareholder activism as denoted in the FactSet
SharkRepellent database and 0 otherwise.
158
159
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in this model, which likely underscores the sample size problem. This
problem is addressed in Section III.D.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table IV examine the wealth effects of a company’s
repeal of the Wachtell Bylaw. In column 3, the coefficient on the constant is
not statistically significant, which shows that for the sample as a whole there
is no meaningful share price decline when a company repeals its bylaw. When
the independent variable DE Incorp. is added in column 4, the coefficient is
positive and significant for that variable at the five percent level, meaning
that Delaware companies increase in value upon repealing these bylaws. Thus,
for repeals, Delaware companies have a larger increase in value than do other
companies in the sample. These effects are discussed below.161
We also examined other corporate governance variables for both repeals
and adoptions, including variables for the presence or absence of a staggered
board. We adopted the same model as in columns 2 and 4, but substituted the
variable DE Incorp. with a dummy variable indicating the presence or absence
of a staggered board. As an added check on our results, we examined whether
the level of institutional ownership affects share price reactions using the
same model. We found no statistically significant returns related to either of
these variables.
These results as a whole show no statistically significant negative reaction
to the adoption of these bylaws for the companies in our sample. Delaware
companies, however, do increase in value upon repeal of these provisions,
perhaps suggesting that for Delaware companies, the bonding to ISS
recommendations adopted by institutional shareholders signals a greater
adherence to corporate governance practices valued by shareholders.
The small sample size is a substantial limitation for these tests, because it
is difficult to exclude the possibility that it is contributing to the lack of
significance in our results. We therefore modified our empirical tests to
address this problem. This adaptation to our empirical method is described
in the next Section.
D. Companies Subject to Shareholder Activism
In light of the limitations associated with the small size of our sample
of adopters and repealers, we devised an alternative empirical approach.
161 As a robustness check, we ran the same cross-sectional analysis using the S&P 500 and
Russell 3000 indices to benchmark for expected returns. For adoptions, we found that companies
have negative excess returns when they adopt these bylaws, statistically significant at the 10% level.
However, we also found that Delaware companies adopting these bylaws have positive returns,
statistically significant at the 10% level. For repeals, the results are similar to those shown in Table
III, though with less statistical significance.
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While we cannot simply gather a larger sample—as far as we can tell, only
the thirty-two companies discussed above adopted the Wachtell Bylaw before
the Provident vote—we were able to examine the effect of the availability of
the Wachtell Bylaw on a wider set of firms. Because the Wachtell Bylaw is
likely to have the most pronounced effect on those firms most likely to undergo
an activist challenge, we isolated a set of those firms using the SharkRepellent
database. Because the Wachtell Bylaw, like a poison pill, can be adopted
immediately if needed, we hypothesized that the share price of firms most
subject to activist attack would react to changes in its availability regardless
of whether they had in fact adopted it. More specifically, we hypothesized
that these firms would experience a reduction in share price on May 13, 2013,
when the Wachtell Bylaw became available, and an increase in share price on
November 27, 2013, when the availability of the Wachtell Bylaw was
constrained by a combination of ISS’s policy against it and the demonstrated
willingness of shareholders to act in a manner consistent with that policy.
This revised empirical strategy has several advantages. First, by focusing
on all companies subject to shareholder activism, we were able to identify a
sample of 486 firms experiencing activism from May 8, 2012 (one year prior
to the Wachtell Memorandum) through November 25, 2014 (the one-year
anniversary of the day before the Provident annual meeting), thus increasing
our sample size more than tenfold. Second, by focusing on all activist targets,
we eliminated a possible selection effect—that is, that firms adopting the
Wachtell Bylaw may be less well governed than those that do not. Third, we
also eliminated the possibility of signaling effects—that is, that by adopting
the Wachtell Bylaw, firms signaled their general susceptibility to activist
attack to the market. Table V reports the frequency of different types of
activism for these firms.
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Table V: Descriptive Statistics of Activism Types162

Proxy Fight

Yes
No

Number
110
376

%
22.63%
77.37%

13D Filer

Yes
No

79
407

16.26%
83.74%

Exempt Solicitation

Yes
No

54
432

11.11%
88.89%

Other Campaign

Yes
No

329
157

67.70%
32.30%

Table V shows that hedge funds have at their disposal, and indeed employ,
a variety of strategies in shareholder activism campaigns. Proxy Fights, or
shareholder activism involving a proxy contest by the activist to either unseat
directors or adopt a shareholder proposal, constituted 22.63% of all activism.
Activists filing a Schedule 13D with the SEC announcing that they had

162 The sample is taken from FactSet SharkRepellent as discussed supra Section III.A. The
variables are defined by FactSet SharkRepellent as follows: Proxy Fight is a campaign

under which a stockholder or group of stockholders solicits the proxy or written consent
of fellow stockholders in support of a resolution it is advancing. This usually involves the
election of dissident nominees to the company’s Board of Directors in opposition to the
company’s director nominees but may also involve campaigns to approve a stockholder
proposal or to vote against a management proposal (including approving a merger).
13D Filer is a “[c]ampaign whereby a member of the SharkWatch50 has filed a Schedule 13D with
the SEC but the filing does not include any publicly disclosed activism.” Exempt Solicitation is a campaign
pursuant to Rule 14a-2(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . under which a
dissident can communicate its views to stockholders without having to comply with SEC
proxy filing and disclosure rules. Unlike a contested solicitation (proxy fight), the
dissident is not seeking the power to act as proxy for a stockholder and does not provide
its own proxy card in its materials.
Other Campaign is
corporate activism made public by activist investors, including hedge funds, and most
commonly involve[s] a dissident agitating for changes with the goal of maximizing
stockholder value or enhancing corporate governance practices. The value maximizing
campaigns attempt to pressure a company to take action to enhance stockholder value,
whether by increasing dividends and stock buybacks or by even calling for the breakup or
sale of the company itself. These campaigns usually take the form of making communications
and letters sent to management at the targeted companies publicly via 13D filings and
press releases, and they often also include the threat of a proxy fight for Board seats.
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acquired more than five percent of the target company’s stock, but who took
no further action, constituted 16.26% of all activist cases. Exempt
Solicitations, or shareholder activism where the activist communicates to
stockholders pursuant to an exemption in the proxy rules to avoid filing a
proxy statement, constituted 11.11% of activism. Finally, Other Campaigns,
which includes public agitation for change at the target not accompanied by
a proxy contest, constituted 67.70% of activism. These numbers exceed 100%
because some companies experienced more than one kind of activism.
Table VI contains cross-sectional event studies examining the wealth
effects of the Wachtell Memorandum, the ISS recommendation, and
Provident shareholder vote on companies subject to shareholder activism
during the selected time period.
Table VI: Companies Subject to Shareholder Activism163
Wachtell Memo
(5/9/13)
(1)

ISS Memo
(11/13/13)
(2)

Provident Vote
(11/27/13)
(3)

ISS FAQ
(1/13/14)
(4)

Constant

0.005
(0.397)

-0.001
(0.808)

0.013
(0.136)

-0.000
(0.980)

Proxy Fight

-0.008*
(0.084)

0.002
(0.658)

0.016**
(0.020)

-0.000
(0.928)

13D Filer

-0.005
(0.435)

-0.001
(0.850)

0.019**
(0.040)

0.004
(0.430)

Exempt
Solicitation

-0.003
(0.656)

0.004
(0.480)

-0.009
(0.394)

-0.001
(0.870)

Other
Campaign

-0.001
(0.903)

0.003
(0.536)

0.000
(0.960)

-0.001
(0.813)

N

486

457

454

450

R2

0.85%

0.28%

3.43%

0.35%

We conducted the analysis in accordance with the models in Table IV by
calculating the excess returns of each company on the date indicated in each
column heading. We then regressed the firm’s excess stock return (over the
163 Variables are as defined supra note 162. P-values are in parentheses with ***, **, and *
representing statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Russell 2000 index return) on the given date against an independent variable
denoting whether the firm had been subject to the given type of shareholder
activism from May 8, 2012 (one year prior to the Wachtell Memorandum)
through November 25, 2014 (the day before the first anniversary of the
Provident meeting).164
We analyzed four event dates in this test. The first is May 9, 2013, the date
of the Wachtell Memorandum. The second is November 13, 2013, the first
trading date after ISS made its recommendation concerning Provident.165 The
third is November 27, 2013, the date that the results of the voting at Provident
were first publicly disclosed. November 27, 2013 was also the day after ISS
released a report for its M&A Edge customers, again criticizing these bylaws
and releasing the number and names of companies who had adopted them to
date. The fourth is January 13, 2014, the date that ISS published a question
and answer memorandum in which it definitively announced its policy to
recommend a withhold vote for all companies adopting the Wachtell Bylaw
or a variation thereof.
We selected each of these four dates because they are significant events
with respect to companies’ and the market’s views on the Wachtell Bylaw.
The May 9, 2013 date is the first broad-based announcement that issuers had
a mechanism for limiting an activist’s ability to adopt a golden leash
compensation arrangement. The November 13, 2013 date is theoretically the
first signal to the market that ISS, the leading proxy advisor, may consistently
oppose the Wachtell Bylaw. The November 27, 2013 date is the first report
to the market indicating that institutional shareholders took the ISS
recommendation seriously and would incorporate it into their voting
decisions on the election of directors. The January 13, 2014 date is the date on
which ISS formalized its policy of recommending withhold votes for
companies adopting a form of the Wachtell Bylaw. Each of these events could
conceivably have informed the market as to whether companies would adopt
these bylaws and, depending upon the market’s perception of the value of
these bylaws, affected stock prices.
The results of these event studies are as follows. The coefficient for the
variable Proxy Fight is significant and negative in column 1 of Table VI,
indicating that upon publication of the Wachtell Memorandum, firms that
had experienced a recent proxy fight or that were about to experience a proxy
fight suffered negative returns. This indicates that the market assigned a

164 In these models, the choice of benchmark returns is irrelevant because all returns are
measured on the same date in a given regression. The independent variables are all dummy variables
marked as 1 if the firm experiences the type of shareholder activism and 0 otherwise.
165 ISS issued its recommendation at 5:30 p.m. on November 12, 2013. E-mail from ISS
Representative to Provident (Jan. 14, 2015) (on file with authors).
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negative value to these bylaws, and perhaps that the market believed that the
Wachtell Bylaw would chill wealth-enhancing shareholder activism. In
column 3 (the November 27 model), the coefficient for the variable Proxy
Fight is positive and significant at the 5% level. However, there is no
significance on the variable Proxy Fight in columns 2 or 4.
The net result is that stock prices of companies in our sample decreased
upon the release of the Wachtell Memorandum, but increased upon the
publication of the results of the Provident annual meeting. This finding is
consistent with the theory that the market believed the Wachtell Bylaw to be
value-decreasing in companies subject to shareholder activism. In particular,
the fact that there is significance in column 3, but not columns 2 and 4, is
consistent with the theory that the market viewed the ISS recommendation
as a credible force only after institutional shareholders had actually shown a
willingness to support it.
Similarly, the independent variable 13D Filer is positive and significant at
the 5% level in column 3 and negative in column 1 (though not significant).
Though it carries the potential for greater activism, a 13D Filer reflects a
lesser form of activism than a Proxy Fight. Therefore, the market reactions
for these companies may not be as strongly consistent with our findings.
In comparison, variables for lesser shareholder activism—Exempt
Solicitation and Other Campaign—are not significant in any columns. This
accords with the theory that only companies greatly impacted by shareholder
activism were affected by the change. Because the golden leash directly affects
the conduct of a proxy contest, the stock prices of companies subject to such
a contest (either historically or prospectively) were more likely to be
influenced by the events studied in Table VI.
Table VII reports similar event studies to those in Table VI, but with one
exception. The samples are based on firms subject to some form of
shareholder activism announced on or after May 9, 2013, the date of the
Wachtell Memorandum. Firms subject to activism before this date are
included in Table VI but excluded from the analysis in Table VII.
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Table VII: Companies Subject to Future Shareholder Activism
Wachtell Memo ISS Memo Provident Vote
(5/9/13)
(11/13/13)
(11/27/13)
(1)
(2)
(3)

ISS FAQ
(1/13/14)
(4)

Constant

-0.000
(0.972)

0.002
(0.718)

0.013
(0.143)

-0.004
(0.417)

Proxy Fight

-0.008
(0.247)

-0.004
(0.498)

0.017**
(0.025)

0.003
(0.422)

13D Filer

-0.001
(0.905)

-0.005
(0.386)

0.019**
(0.036)

0.006
(0.272)

Exempt
Solicitation

-0.001
(0.899)

-0.000
(0.963)

-0.010
(0.395)

0.003
(0.608)

Other
Campaign

0.004
(0.554)

0.001
(0.918)

-0.002
(0.822)

0.000
(0.968)

N

355

342

340

336

R2

1.08%

0.62%

5.21%

0.81%

In this table, in contrast to Table VI, the coefficient for Proxy Fight is
negative but not significant in column 1, and there is no other statistically
significant variable in the model. This means there is no statistically
significant market reaction to the Wachtell Memorandum (column 1) for the
subset of companies that experienced shareholder activism after the issuance
of the memorandum. However, those companies that experienced shareholder
activism after the issuance of the Wachtell Memorandum had a similar
reaction to the Provident vote (column 3); the variables Proxy Fight and 13D
Filer are positive and significant at the 5% level.
The implication of this finding is that the reaction to the Wachtell
Memorandum appears to be concentrated in those firms that had already
experienced shareholder activism-----perhaps because the immediacy of
such activism led the market to anticipate that those issuers were most
likely to deploy the Wachtell Bylaw. In contrast, for those companies at
which the market simply anticipated future activism, the Provident vote
may have conveyed information not just about the availability of the
golden leash but also about investors’ receptiveness to an activist event.
In unreported results, we also examined the adopters and repealers of the
Wachtell Bylaw set forth in Table IV using the same models as Table VII to
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determine if the market reacted similarly. We found no significant results,
implying that the market assigned different value effects to companies based
on their susceptibility to shareholder activism.
Finally, in Appendix A, we conducted a robustness check to further
examine our initial findings about the wealth effects of the Wachtell Bylaw,
the effect of ISS, and the announcement of the Provident results by
performing a matched pair analysis—that is, examining the performance of
similarly situated companies with and without shareholder activism. A
matched pair analysis allowed us to perform a more precise comparison of
how the market perceived the Wachtell Bylaw by eliminating variability due
to differences in companies.
Our findings are similar to (or perhaps even stronger than) our main
results. In the matched pair analysis, we found that, as in Table VI, the
coefficient for the variable Proxy Fight is negative and significant in column
1 of Table A-I, indicating that firms that experienced a proxy fight or that
were about to experience a proxy fight suffered negative returns relative to
their matched firms that did not experience activism. As in Tables VI and
VII, in column 3 the coefficients for the variables Proxy Fight and 13D Filer
are positive and significant in both Tables A-I and A-II. However, in Table
A-II the coefficient for Proxy Fight in column 1 is also negative and significant,
implying that companies subject to future activism also experienced negative
returns following the release of the Wachtell Memorandum. This finding
suggests that the market may be anticipating the activist events at these firms
and valuing the potential of a golden leash compensation arrangement in light
of that anticipation.
To summarize our empirical results as a whole, while we could not find a
price reaction for those firms that did in fact adopt and repeal the Wachtell
Bylaw—due perhaps, to the small number of firms involved—we did find
evidence in our matched pair analysis of a statistically significant decrease in
stock price on the date the Wachtell Bylaw became available to those firms
that would later become targets of proxy fights (this evidence was contrary to our
findings in Table VII which found that our results were driven by companies
targeted for shareholder activism before the Wachtell Memorandum). Similarly,
we found that the announcement of the Provident meeting vote was associated
with a statistically significant increase in stock price for firms that would become
targets of proxy fights as well as those firms that would be subject to 13D
filings. We confirmed this finding in a matched pair analysis robustness check.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
Our core findings portray a complex and multidimensional view of
corporate governance. Our analysis of the thirty-two adopters and repealers
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does not identify a single factor explaining which companies adopted the
Wachtell Bylaw. Our empirical analysis fails to demonstrate a price effect for
those firms that adopted the Wachtell Bylaw. Nevertheless, we found
evidence of a price impact in our analysis of a larger sample of those firms
that were most likely to become the targets of future activism. The
implications of these findings are presented in greater detail below.
A. Governance Intermediaries and the Differential
Pricing of Governance Terms
In Section II.B above, we sketched the role of governance intermediaries
in contemporary capital markets where large blocks of shares are held by
predominantly passive institutional investors. Unlike disintermediated capital
markets in which shareholders actively influence firms’ corporate governance
choices through the collective pressure of their buy and sell decisions, in
contemporary capital markets, governance intermediaries are indispensable
agents of innovation and change. On the one hand, our findings support this
account, demonstrating the significant influence enjoyed by both Wachtell
and ISS, and highlighting areas in which their input is critically needed. On
the other hand, our findings suggest a basis to criticize how governance
intermediaries presently conduct this vital role.
Our findings reveal the power of both Wachtell and ISS. On May 13, 2013,
Wachtell made a public suggestion that was quickly adopted by thirty-two
firms. Moreover, our findings show that the Wachtell recommendation
influenced far more than the thirty-two firms that ultimately adopted the
bylaw. Because the firm made its policy recommendation in the form of a
bylaw that could be adopted by any firm at any time, the policy had an
immediate market-wide effect, observable even in the share price of firms
that had not adopted the bylaw.
However, our findings show that the companies first adopting this bylaw
did not appear to have a single or predictable rationale. Although many of the
firms were subject to some type of activist interest, the company-specific
response may also be explained by network effects or saliency in the market.
Perhaps because of this, we did not find significant direct evidence of an
immediate price effect associated with the adoption or repeal of the bylaw.
Our findings show that ISS wields similar wide-ranging influence. Not
only did its recommendation lead to a large number of withhold votes for
Provident directors, its threat to make withhold recommendations against
other firms that had adopted the Wachtell Bylaw led to widespread rescission
of the bylaw. ISS’s threat also led to a statistically significant and economically
meaningful increase in share price for those companies that seemed likely to
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adopt the bylaw before the Provident vote but that now, following the threat,
likely would not.
With regard to ISS, our findings also support the view that investors do
not treat everything ISS says with equal weight.166 We found no market
reaction, for example, to the November 13, 2013 policy pronouncement
concerning the Wachtell Bylaw that ISS made at the same time ISS issued its
withhold recommendation for the upcoming Provident vote. Only on
November 27, after 34% of shareholders voted to withhold their votes from
the Provident board and ISS threatened withhold recommendations against
all other directors who had adopted the Wachtell Bylaw, did the market give
effect to the ISS position. Perhaps the initial ISS position did not move the
market because the market was unable to gauge how seriously shareholders
would take it. Once shareholders validated the ISS position by voting against
the Provident board, the market accepted the ISS policy as a meaningful
constraint on the Wachtell Bylaw. It is not just what ISS says, in other words,
that moves the market. It is when the market believes ISS has credible
influence with investors—that is, when investors have demonstrated a
willingness to incorporate the ISS position into their voting decisions.
Perhaps most interesting is the way in which these intermediaries
interacted to provoke governance reform. The case of the golden leash
presents an activist invention (the golden leash), which provoked a corporatist
response (the Wachtell Bylaw), which in turn provoked a proxy advisory
recommendation, followed by a demonstration by institutional investors that
they took the recommendation seriously (the Provident vote). But these
roles may be interchangeable. There is no reason, for example, that the
corporatist intervention could not come first, as indeed it did with respect to
fee-shifting bylaws. In that context, following a decision of the Delaware
Supreme Court that seemed to authorize fee-shifting,167 a group of important
corporate law firms—notably, excluding Wachtell—publicly recommended
that corporations adopt fee-shifting bylaws.168 ISS subsequently took a
position against the bylaw provisions.169 Before the issue could be decided by
governance intermediaries, however, the Delaware legislature banned the
adoption of fee-shifting bylaws.170

See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 559-60 (Del. 2014).
See Sean J. Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder Litigation by Shifting
the Doctrine on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1, 26-27 (2015).
169 ISS, UNITED STATES PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES UPDATES: 2015 BENCHMARK
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 3, 6-7 (2014).
170 See S.B. 75, 148th Gen. Assemb., Sec. 2 (Del. 2015), http://legis.delaware.gov/LIS/lis148.
nsf/vwLegislation/SB+75/$file/legis.html?open [http://perma.cc/CSD2-2E74].
166
167
168
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Aside from demonstrating their influence and importance, our findings
also pose a challenge for governance intermediaries. Presently, governance
intermediaries offer market-wide pronouncements. Wachtell, for example,
inveighs against activism in all of its forms, and ISS, for its part, applies its
governance policies on a marketwide basis.171 Yet our findings suggest that
one size does not fit all when it comes to corporate governance. Rather, if
markets and companies react heterogeneously to corporate governance terms,
the claim that a particular governance term is universally harmful (or
beneficial) to shareholders is suspect, and governance intermediaries’
marketwide pronouncements to that effect are likely untrue.
Ultimately, our study supports the proposition that corporate governance
should be decided on a firm-by-firm basis. Governance intermediaries should not
make claims about the universal merits or deficiencies of specific governance
provisions or structures, but instead should evaluate the needs of particular
firms. Firms, for their part, should engage with governance intermediaries to
explain their specific circumstances and demonstrate how their governance
structure is responsive to those circumstances. Moreover, firms should assess
the impact of governance terms and perhaps adopt them, not in response to
governance intermediaries, but based on their relevance to value creation.
B. Price Discrimination in the Market for Governance Terms
While we did find evidence for skepticism that companies are correctly
adopting corporate governance terms, we also found evidence that the market
is reacting to these terms. For the broader sample we observed a statistically
significant price effect. Our results thus provide some measure of evidence
supporting a key pillar of corporate law theory—at least since Easterbrook
and Fischel—that the market prices governance terms.172
A more interesting implication of our study, however, lies not in what it
says about whether the market prices governance terms, but in what it shows
us about how the market prices governance. Different firms, we found, reacted
differently.173 Much of the literature discussed above assumes, for example,
that separation of the chairman and CEO roles or adoption or repeal of a
staggered board provision will have much the same effect across all firms in the
market.174 Our study suggests a contrary conclusion: that governance provisions
have heterogeneous effects depending upon firm-specific characteristics and
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
See James A. Brickley et al., Leadership Structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the
Board, 3 J. CORP. FIN. 189 (1997) (conducting an identical analysis on a set of companies to examine
the pros and cons of separating the CEO and Chairmanship role).
171
172
173
174

698

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 164: 649

investor perception of those characteristics. It offers evidence that in pricing
governance terms, investors may focus on those firms most clearly affected by
the relevant provision. In our case, protections against activism matter most
for firms that investors perceive as likely to be subject to activism, where that
perception may be based on recent or anticipated activist activity.
We hesitate to accord great weight to our general pricing conclusions
because our study is confined to only one provision in a small subsample of
companies. Still, our research both supports existing corporate law theory and
provides a basis for further research.
Our fundamental finding is that the market reacted to the availability of
the golden leash specifically at those companies that were most likely to
experience shareholder activism. This suggests that the market both values
and prices governance changes. Our finding that this price effect is limited to
potential activist targets, however, raises a broader concern. If investors do
not respond to a governance innovation unless and until its effect on a specific
firm is both salient and foreseeable, managers may get a free pass for adopting
terms that, on a clear day, are viewed as economically insignificant, but that
ultimately prove harmful to shareholders.
C. Activism
We found a statistically significant and economically important negative
price reaction to the Wachtell Bylaw. When the Bylaw was first made available,
the price of those firms most likely to implement it declined by 0.8%.175 And
when significant obstacles arose to the adoption of the Wachtell Bylaw, the
price of those firms most affected increased by over 1%.176 What are we to
make of the dim view the market seems to take of the Wachtell Bylaw?
One possibility is that the market seems to have a generally favorable view
of activists, and is skeptical of tools that weaken them. The Wachtell Bylaw
is, as we have shown, a protective measure against a specific activist tactic—
namely, the golden leash. It takes away the power to offer special compensation
arrangements to director nominees, a power that may be useful to activists
challenging recalcitrant boards. As such, the Wachtell Bylaw may be viewed
as a board entrenchment tool. The market’s consistently negative response to
it may be seen as a vote in favor of activism and against entrenchment.
But does the market’s apparently favorable view of activism imply that
activism is socially desirable? Our results do not address this question. All
participants in the debate over activism agree that activist interventions
See supra Table VI, Column 1.
See supra Table VI, Column 3 (showing a 1.6% increase in price for firms subject to proxy
fights and a 1.9% increase for firms subject to a 13D filing).
175
176
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typically lead to at least a short-term increase in share price.177 The debate is
largely over whether this short-term increase in share price is associated with
a longer-term increase in firm value or if, instead, a short-term reshuffling of the
business that tends to jeopardize the long-term health of the firm. The debate,
in other words, cannot be settled by reference to short-term price effects.
Because the debate over the social value of activism takes a longer-term view,
our findings cannot and do not address it, and thus cannot assess the social
utility of golden leashes.
CONCLUSION
This Article has presented the golden leash compensation arrangement
and the bylaw proposed in response to it as a case study of corporate
governance innovation in contemporary capital markets. It demonstrates the
crucial role played by governance intermediaries—here, law firms and proxy
advisors—and documents the role of each in transmitting governance
information to the market. Our pricing study shows evidence that share
prices reacted to the availability of the golden leash, but primarily at firms
that investors perceived as activist targets. Moreover, share prices reacted to
the actions of key intermediaries, rather than firm-specific adoptions or
repeals. These findings portray a complex picture of corporate governance
that is, in some ways, contrary to traditional notions. Governance innovations
appear to be filtered through intermediaries that advocate for governance
provisions without necessarily considering their effects on a company-bycompany basis. Meanwhile, markets seem to pay limited attention to
governance innovations that are not viewed as having an immediate payoff.
All of this has important implications for the literature on the price effects
of corporate governance terms, the proper role of governance intermediaries,
and the ongoing academic debate over shareholder activism. In particular,
investors should be skeptical of the sweeping claims of governance
intermediaries, and boards should work harder to explain their firm-specific
needs both to governance intermediaries and to their shareholder base. Our
findings also demonstrate some basis for skepticism of empirical studies that
make broad claims about wealth effects that may result from the adoption or
repeal of corporate governance provisions.

177 See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L.
REV. 1085, 1087-89 (2015) (reviewing the literature on shareholder activism and noting the general
agreement as to short term gains which typically result from such activism); Alon Brav et al., Hedge
Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 4 J. FIN. 1729, 1756 (2006) (finding short
term abnormal returns surrounding the period of announcement).
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APPENDIX—MATCHED PAIR ANALYSIS

In this appendix we examined our initial findings about the wealth effects
of the Wachtell Bylaw, the effect of ISS, and the announcement of the
Provident results by performing a matched pair analysis—that is, by
examining the performance of similarly situated companies with and without
shareholder activism. A matched pair analysis allows us to perform a more
precise comparison of how the market perceived the Wachtell Bylaw by
eliminating variability due to differences in companies. Table A-I reports the
results of this analysis for all of the companies in our sample.
Table A-I: Companies Subject to Shareholder Activism,
Plus Matched Sample of Non-Activism Firms178
Wachtell Memo ISS Memo Provident Vote
(5/9/13)
(11/13/13)
(11/27/13)

ISS FAQ
(1/13/14)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Constant

0.001
(0.435)

0.004**
(0.011)

0.017***
(0.000)

0.001
(0.298)

Proxy Fight

-0.006*
(0.083)

-0.001
(0.789)

0.014*
(0.053)

-0.001
(0.727)

13D Filer

-0.002
(0.640)

-0.005
(0.278)

0.015*
(0.076)

0.003
(0.478)

Exempt
Solicitation

-0.000
(0.987)

-0.001
(0.923)

-0.013
(0.199)

-0.002
(0.614)

Other
Campaign

0.003
(0.313)

-0.002
(0.472)

-0.004
(0.472)

-0.002
(0.280)

N

972

924

919

913

R2

0.42%

0.19%

1.03%

0.24%

We again examined each of the four dates analyzed in Tables VI and VII.
The dependent variable in each model is the firm’s excess stock return on the
given date. Independent variables are 0/1 binary indicators of whether a firm
was subject to the given type of shareholder activism from May 8, 2012 (one
178 Variables are as defined supra note 162. P-values are in parentheses with ***, **, and *
representing statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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year prior to the Wachtell Memorandum) through November 25, 2014 (the
day before the release of the ISS recommendation).
Each column adds a matched sample of firms that were not subject to
shareholder activism since 2009. Matching firms are based on the closest
equity market capitalization of a firm in the same two-digit SIC code on April
8, 2013 (one month prior to the Wachtell Memorandum). Activism firms
and/or their matching firms are not replaced if one is delisted after the first
event study date.
Similar to our findings in Table VI, the coefficient for the variable Proxy
Fight is negative and significant in column 1 of Table A-I, indicating that
firms that experienced a proxy fight or that were about to experience a proxy
fight suffered negative returns relative to their matched firms that did not
experience activism. Again, in column 3 the coefficients for the variables
Proxy Fight and 13D File are positive and significant as in Table VI above.
To test the robustness of these findings, in Table A-II we perform a
matched pair analysis for companies subject to activism after to the issuance
of the Wachtell Memorandum.
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Table A-II: Companies Subject to Future Shareholder Activism, Plus Matched
Sample of Non-Activism Firms179
Wachtell Memo ISS Memo Provident Vote
(5/9/13)
(11/13/13)
(11/27/13)

ISS FAQ
(1/13/14)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Constant

0.001
(0.487)

0.005**
(0.011)

0.017***
(0.000)

0.001
(0.399)

Proxy Fight

-0.009*
(0.082)

-0.005
(0.270)

0.015**
(0.016)

0.000
(0.913)

13D Filer

-0.002
(0.673)

-0.007
(0.141)

0.016**
(0.019)

0.002
(0.682)

Exempt
Solicitation

-0.003
(0.704)

-0.003
(0.687)

-0.013
(0.154)

-0.001
(0.783)

Other
Campaign

0.003
(0.366)

-0.002
(0.568)

-0.005
(0.207)

-0.004*
(0.056)

N

710

682

679

674

R2

0.58%

0.54%

2.31%

0.59%

Our results mirror those found in Table A-I. As with Table VII, the
implication of this finding is that our results in Table A-II are being driven
predominantly by companies that experienced shareholder activism after the
issuance of the Wachtell Memorandum.

179 Variables are as defined supra note 162. P-values are in parentheses with ***, **, and *
representing statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

